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Security Council**

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~~Seventy-second session~~  
~~Agenda item 31~~  
~~Prevention of armed conflict~~

**Security Council**  
**Seventy-second year**

**Letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative  
of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General**

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the state border with the Republic of Armenia during the month of January 2017 (see annex I); and the ceasefire violations record, as registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, during the month of January 2017 (see annex II).

I kindly request that the present letter and the annexes thereto be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zohrab Mnatsakanyan  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



**Annex I to the letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the state border with the Republic of Armenia during the period from 1 to 31 January 2017**

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Direction</i>                              | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>         |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 01 January  | <b>Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions</b> | 31                         | Small arms and light weapons: 692              |
|             | Cinari                                        | 4                          |                                                |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 3                          |                                                |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 3                          |                                                |
|             | Movses                                        | 2                          |                                                |
|             | Vazashen                                      | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Aygehovit                                     | 2                          |                                                |
|             | Berkaber                                      | 2                          |                                                |
|             | Nerkin Karkiraghbyur                          | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Dovegh                                        | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Koti                                          | 2                          |                                                |
|             | Baghanis                                      | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Jil                                           | 2                          |                                                |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 7                          |                                                |
| 02 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 3                          | Small arms and light weapons: 25               |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Cinari                                        | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Paruyr Sevak                                  | 1                          |                                                |
| 03 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 4                          | Small arms and light weapons: 37               |
|             | Chinari                                       | 2                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2                |
|             | Movses                                        | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          |                                                |
| 04 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 27                         | Small arms and light weapons: 361              |
|             | Cinari                                        | 18                         | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15               |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 4                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Chinari: 11; |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          | Aygedzor: 6)                                   |
|             | Movses                                        | 1                          | Large-calibre machine guns: 22 (Chinari)       |
|             | Berkaber                                      | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 1                          |                                                |
|             | Paruyr Sevak                                  | 1                          |                                                |
| 05 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 11                         | Small arms and light weapons: 109              |
|             | Chinari                                       | 3                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1                |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 3                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Chinari)      |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          |                                                |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Direction</i>                              | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>     |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|             | Berkaber                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 3                          |                                            |
| 06 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 8                          | Small arms and light weapons: 93           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 5                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Chinari)  |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 2                          | Large-calibre machine guns: 7 (Chinari)    |
|             | Paruyr Sevak                                  | 1                          |                                            |
| 07 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 11                         | Small arms and light weapons: 48           |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 5                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3            |
|             | Movses                                        | 4                          |                                            |
|             | Berkaber                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             |                                               | 1                          |                                            |
| 08 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 17                         | Small arms and light weapons: 266          |
|             | Chinari                                       | 15                         | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 32           |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Chinari)  |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 1                          | Large-calibre machine guns: 4 (Chinari)    |
| 09 January  | <b>Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions</b> | 12                         | Small arms and light weapons: 94           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 4                          | Large-calibre machine guns: 5 (Vahan)      |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Berkaber                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Berdavan                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Vahan                                         | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 2                          |                                            |
| 10 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 8                          | Small arms and light weapons: 56           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 2                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Aygedzor) |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 5                          |                                            |
|             | Berdavan                                      | 1                          |                                            |
| 11 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 4                          | Small arms and light weapons: 21           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 2                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2            |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 2                          |                                            |
| 12 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 6                          | Small arms and light weapons: 37           |
|             | Aygepar                                       | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Chinari                                       | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Koti                                          | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 2                          |                                            |
| 13 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 11                         | Small arms and light weapons: 62           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 6                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2            |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 4                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Aygedzor) |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          |                                            |
| 14 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 8                          | Small arms and light weapons: 76           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 2                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5            |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 1                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Baghanis) |
|             | N. Karmiraghbyur                              | 1                          |                                            |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Direction</i>                                      | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>                   |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|             | Paravakar                                             | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Baghanis                                              | 3                          |                                                          |
| 15 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                                  | 17                         | Small arms and light weapons: 146                        |
|             | Chinari                                               | 10                         | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16                         |
|             | Aygedzor                                              | 4                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Chinari)                |
|             | Paravakar                                             | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Movses                                                | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Berkaber                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
| 16 January  | <b>Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions</b> | 20                         | Small arms and light weapons: 272                        |
|             |                                                       | 6                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10                         |
|             | Chinari                                               | 7                          |                                                          |
|             | Aygedzor                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Berkaber                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Vazashen                                              | 2                          |                                                          |
|             | Chapni                                                | 2                          |                                                          |
|             | Jil                                                   | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Paruyr Sevak                                          |                            |                                                          |
| 17 January  | <b>Tavush, Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions</b>         | 19                         | Small arms and light weapons: 145                        |
|             |                                                       | 1                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Chinari: 1; Aygepar: 1) |
|             | Aygedzor                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Chinari                                               | 5                          |                                                          |
|             | Movses                                                | 4                          |                                                          |
|             | Nerkin Karmiraghbyur                                  | 3                          |                                                          |
|             | Aygepar                                               | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Berkaber                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Berdavan                                              | 2                          |                                                          |
|             | Yeraskh                                               | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Khndzorut                                             |                            |                                                          |
| 18 January  | <b>Tavush and Gegharkunik regions</b>                 | 12                         | Small arms and light weapons: 105                        |
|             |                                                       | 6                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Chinari)                |
|             | Aygedzor                                              |                            |                                                          |
|             | Chinari                                               | 2                          |                                                          |
|             | Paravakar                                             | 2                          |                                                          |
|             | Movses                                                | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Daranak                                               | 1                          |                                                          |
| 19 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                                  | 19                         | Small arms and light weapons: 270                        |
|             | Chinari                                               | 9                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6                          |
|             | Aygedzor                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Paravakar                                             | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Movses                                                | 4                          |                                                          |
|             | Aygepar                                               | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Vazashen                                              | 1                          |                                                          |
|             | Berdavan                                              | 2                          |                                                          |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Direction</i>                      | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>     |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| 20 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>      | 12                         | Small arms and light weapons: 105          |
|             | Chinari                               | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 3                          |                                            |
|             | Movses                                | 3                          |                                            |
|             | Paravakar                             | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                               | 3                          |                                            |
| 21 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>      | 9                          | Small arms and light weapons: 58           |
|             | Chinari                               | 3                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Voskevan) |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Movses                                | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Voskevan                              | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                               | 1                          |                                            |
| 22 January  | <b>Tavus and, Gegharkunik regions</b> | 7                          | Small arms and light weapons: 109          |
|             | Chinari                               | 2                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Ttujur)  |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Paravakar                             | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Movses                                | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Koti                                  | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Ttujur                                | 1                          |                                            |
| 23 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>      | 10                         | Small arms and light weapons: 123          |
|             | Chinari                               | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 3                          |                                            |
|             | Paravakar                             | 4                          |                                            |
|             | Paruyr Sevak                          | 1                          |                                            |
| 24 January  | <b>Tavush and Gegharkunik regions</b> | 13                         | Small arms and light weapons: 332          |
|             | Chinari                               | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 6                          |                                            |
|             | Aygepar                               | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Vazashen                              | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Jil                                   | 2                          |                                            |
| 25 January  | <b>Tavush and Vayots Dzor regions</b> | 11                         | Small arms and light weapons: 185          |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 1                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3            |
|             | Aygepar                               | 1                          | Large-calibre machine guns: 20             |
|             | Paravakar                             | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Sarigyugh                             | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Kirants                               | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Voskevan                              | 3                          |                                            |
|             | Khndzorut                             | 1                          |                                            |
| 26 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>      | 17                         | Small arms and light weapons: 142          |
|             | Aygedzor                              | 3                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1            |
|             | Chinari                               | 5                          | Large-calibre machine guns: 5 (Baghanis)   |
|             | Aygepar                               | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Paravakar                             | 1                          |                                            |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Direction</i>                              | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>     |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|             | Voskepar                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Koti                                          | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Voskevan                                      | 3                          |                                            |
|             | Baghanis                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 1                          |                                            |
| 27 January  | <b>Tavush region</b>                          | 25                         | Small arms and light weapons: 294          |
|             | Chinari                                       | 14                         | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 65           |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 2                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Chinari) |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 3                          |                                            |
|             | Movses                                        | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Vazashen                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Kayan                                         | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Voskevan                                      | 2                          |                                            |
|             | Berdavan                                      | 1                          |                                            |
| 28 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 3                          | Small arms and light weapons: 12           |
|             | Nerkin Karmiraghbyur                          | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 1                          |                                            |
| 29 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 4                          | Small arms and light weapons: 18           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Vazashen                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 1                          |                                            |
| 30 January  | <b>Tavush and Ararat regions</b>              | 6                          | Small arms and light weapons: 82           |
|             | Chinari                                       | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Berkaber                                      | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Kayan                                         | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Aygehovit                                     | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 2                          |                                            |
| 31 January  | <b>Tavush, Ararat and Vayots Dzor regions</b> | 5                          | Small arms and light weapons: 21           |
|             | Aygedzor                                      | 1                          | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1            |
|             | Chinari                                       | 1                          | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Chinari)  |
|             | Paravakar                                     | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Yeraskh                                       | 1                          |                                            |
|             | Khndzorut                                     |                            |                                            |

**Annex II to the letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the period from 1 to 31 January 2017**

| <i>Date</i>             | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 01 January              | 46                         | Small arms and light weapons: 1,248<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 102<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Kurapatkino)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 5 (Talish)                                                     |
| 02 January              | 19                         | Small arms and light weapons: 228<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Talish)                                                                                                                                           |
| 03 January              | 33                         | Small arms and light weapons: 353<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 31 (Mount Karachuk: 4; Kurapatkino: 8; Seysulan: 4; Yarmja: 11; Namerli: 4)<br>Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja) |
| 04 January              | 27                         | Small arms and light weapons: 747<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Seysulan)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 2 (Sarijanli)                                                        |
| 05 January              | 27                         | Small arms and light weapons: 430<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20                                                                                                                                                   |
| 06 January              | 18                         | Small arms and light weapons: 338<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Gyulistan)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 10 (Leonarkh)<br>Grenade launchers: 2 (Talish)                      |
| 07 January <sup>a</sup> | 32                         | Small arms and light weapons: 392<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 33 (Mehdili: 18; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli: 5; Kurapatkino: 1; Leonarkh: 4; Gyulistan: 5)                             |
| 08 January              | 40                         | Small arms and light weapons: 556<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 68<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Seysulan)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 3 (Seysulan)                                                         |

| <i>Date</i>             | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 09 January              | 21                         | Small arms and light weapons: 379<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Seysulan: 2; Gyulistan: 5)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 10 (Gyulistan)                                                                                                             |
| 10 January              | 31                         | Small arms and light weapons: 652<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Mount Gyamish)<br>Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Talish)                                                                                                                                  |
| 11 January              | 37                         | Small arms and light weapons: 1,005<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Gyulistan: 7; Yanshak: 1)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 110 (Dastagir: 10; Choporlu: 100)                                                                                         |
| 12 January              | 25                         | Small arms and light weapons: 367<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 31 (Ashaghi Veysali: 1; Gyulistan: 30)                                                                                                                                                  |
| 13 January              | 29                         | Small arms and light weapons: 689<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Mehdili: 4; Talish: 3; Gyulistan: 2)                                                                                                                                                 |
| 14 January              | 28                         | Small arms and light weapons: 448<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Seysulan: 5; Yarmja: 13)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 30 (Choporlu)<br>Grenade launchers: 1 (Seysulan)                                                                             |
| 15 January <sup>o</sup> | 25                         | Small arms and light weapons: 313<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 30<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Mehdili)                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 16 January              | 66                         | Small arms and light weapons: 424<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Kengerli: 3; Yarmja: 7; Geytape: 2; Gyulistan: 10)<br>Small-calibre mortars: 57 (Karakhanbeyli: 2; Karvend: 1; Geytape: 39; Bash Karvend: 1; Kengerli: 4; Taghibeyli: 7; Yarmja: 3) |
| 17 January <sup>r</sup> | 46                         | Small arms and light weapons: 701<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 29<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Yarmja)                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 18 January <sup>d</sup> | 44                         | Small arms and light weapons: 486<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 29<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Bash Karvend: 2; Shikhiyar: 10; Seysulan: 6; Yarmja: 5)<br>Grenade launchers: 1 (Talish)                                                                                            |

| <i>Date</i>             | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19 January              | 54                         | Small arms and light weapons: 497<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 39<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 101 (Mehdili: 8; Karvend: 10; Shikhlyar: 40; Sejsulan: 34; Yarmja: 9)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 37 (Verin Chaylu) |
| 20 January <sup>c</sup> | 48                         | Small arms and light weapons: 996<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Shikhlyar: 8; Sejsulan: 1)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 1 (Kurapatkino)                                           |
| 21 January              | 58                         | Small arms and light weapons: 755<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Mehdili: 1; Shikhlyar: 5; Yarmja: 15)<br>Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Sejsulan)                                       |
| 22 January <sup>c</sup> | 40                         | Small arms and light weapons: 920<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 26 (Karvend: 9; Sarijanli: 1; Talish: 16)<br>Grenade launchers: 4 (Talish)                                             |
| 23 January              | 39                         | Small arms and light weapons: 327<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 36 (Bash Karvend: 26; Shikhlyar: 6; Levonarkh: 1; Yarmja: 3)                                                           |
| 24 January              | 20                         | Small arms and light weapons: 142<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Bash Karvend: 18; Shikhlyar: 5)<br>Grenade launchers: 1<br>Small-calibre mortars: 5 (Sejsulan: 1; Yarmja: 4)       |
| 25 January              | 11                         | Small arms and light weapons: 407<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11                                                                                                                                                         |
| 26 January              | 8                          | Small arms and light weapons: 63                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 27 January              | 21                         | Small arms and light weapons: 141<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Bash Karvend)                                                                                                        |
| 28 January              | 14                         | Small arms and light weapons: 173<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Levonarkh)                                                                                                           |
| 29 January              | 16                         | Small arms and light weapons: 235<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4                                                                                                                                                          |
| 30 January              | 14                         | Small arms and light weapons: 85<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Sejsulan)                                                                                                             |

| <i>Date</i> | <i>Number of incidents</i> | <i>Types of weapon/number of shots</i>                                                                              |
|-------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 31 January  | 20                         | Small arms and light weapons: 233<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30 (Mehdili) |

<sup>a</sup> At 11.40 a.m., in the vicinity of the village of Mehdili, Aram Papoyan, a tractor driver, was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

<sup>b</sup> On 15 January, Garik Vardanyan, a soldier who had been wounded by the Azerbaijani side on 30 December 2016, died in the hospital.

<sup>c</sup> At 10.40 a.m., in the vicinity of the village of Karvend, Artik Balayan, a soldier, was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

<sup>d</sup> At 2 p.m., in the vicinity of the village of Horadiz, Andranik Musikyan, a soldier, was fatally wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

<sup>e</sup> At 3.05 p.m., in the vicinity of the village of Taghibeyli, Aleksan Avanesyan, a soldier, was wounded by the Azerbaijani side.

<sup>f</sup> At 11.25 p.m., in the vicinity of the village of Yusifjanli, Karen Ulubabyan, a soldier, was fatally wounded by the Azerbaijani side.



## General Assembly

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### Seventy-first session

Agenda items 19 and 73 (a)

### Sustainable development

Oceans and the law of the sea: oceans and the law of the sea

## **Accreditation and participation of intergovernmental organizations in the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development and its preparatory meeting**

### **Note by the Secretariat**

The Secretariat has received requests for accreditation from the following organizations to participate as intergovernmental organizations in the work of the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development and its preparatory meeting, with observer status, in accordance with paragraph 15 of annex II to General Assembly resolution 70/303:

Commission for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission





## General Assembly

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### Implementation of resolution 71/130 on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic

#### Report of the Secretary-General

##### *Summary*

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/130, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report within 45 days on the implementation of the resolution. It provides an update on political, security, humanitarian and human rights aspects of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic during the period from 9 December 2016 to 25 January 2017. It also contains recommendations on ways and means to protect civilians, as requested in the resolution.



## I. Introduction

1. The overall situation in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be characterized by armed conflict between the Government, armed opposition groups, Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Security Council-designated terrorist groups. Parties to the conflict continued to be supported by outside actors, some of which carried out direct military action on the ground, namely Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation, Turkey and members of the anti-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) coalition led by the United States of America, as well as Hizbullah. By the end of December, government military operations, supported by Iranian-backed militias, Hizbullah and the Russian Federation, to retake the eastern parts of the city of Aleppo from armed opposition groups had been completed, as had the evacuation of the remaining members of those groups and civilians wishing to leave with them.

2. The reporting period witnessed increased diplomatic activity, culminating in an agreement between the Russian Federation and Turkey to act as guarantors of a ceasefire, which went into effect on 30 December, and to undertake efforts to organize a meeting in Astana on 23 and 24 January 2017 between representatives of the Government and armed opposition groups. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria participated in this effort and also announced his intention to convene intra-Syrian negotiations in Geneva on 8 February.

3. The humanitarian situation remained grave. Humanitarian access by the United Nations and its partners to besieged and hard-to-reach areas remained severely obstructed, predominantly by the Government. December was the worst month of 2016 in terms of humanitarian access to those most in need. More than half a million civilians remained under siege, the overwhelming majority by the Government. Deeply disturbing reports of disregard for international humanitarian law by the parties to the conflict continued to be received.

4. On 21 December, the Security Council received a summary of the findings of the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into the attack on a United Nations-Syrian Arab Red Crescent relief operation to Urum al-Kubra on 19 September (see S/2016/1093).

5. Reports of the use of banned munitions, especially by the Government, continued to reveal violations of international norms on indiscriminate weapons and the principle of proportionality. The reports included the use of cluster munitions, incendiary phosphorous munitions, barrel bombs, bunker-busting bombs and chemical weapons in densely populated civilian areas. Civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, emergency response facilities and personnel and drinking water, has reportedly been targeted by air strikes by the Government and allied forces. There were also reports of indiscriminate attacks on civilians by the armed opposition, including attacks on civilian infrastructure, such as the shelling of urban areas and an attack on a convoy of empty buses en route to the besieged towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya.

6. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic continued to document violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law on the basis of information

collected outside the country, given that, as at the time of writing, the Government continued to deny the Commission access to its territory. On 21 December, by its resolution 71/248, the General Assembly established the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. Pursuant to that resolution, the Assembly has before it a report outlining the terms of reference of the Mechanism, including its mandate, methodology, legal framework and other relevant aspects, in addition to the steps envisaged to ensure its speedy establishment and full functioning (A/71/755). The Mechanism should complement the Commission of Inquiry by applying established investigative and prosecutorial practices, in accordance with international criminal law standards. Careful, systematic compilation of physical and witness evidence should facilitate and expedite the current or future work of national, regional or international courts or tribunals.

## II. Implementation of resolution 71/130

7. On 19 December, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2328 (2016), in which it requested the United Nations and other relevant institutions to carry out adequate, neutral monitoring and direct observation of evacuations from the eastern and other districts of Aleppo and demanded that all parties provide the monitors with safe, immediate and unimpeded access. Welcoming the adoption of the resolution, and with the aim of building on the initial momentum generated, the Special Envoy announced on 19 December that the United Nations would reconvene the formal intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by the Council in its resolution 2254 (2015) in Geneva in February 2017.

8. On 29 December, the Russian Federation and Turkey announced that a ceasefire would enter into force on 30 December, to be monitored by a joint Russian-Turkish commission, with checkpoints on the ground. The signing of agreements with the Government and with key armed opposition groups to form delegations to launch negotiations in Astana on a political settlement aimed at a comprehensive resolution of the crisis by peaceful means was also announced. Press statements on the ceasefire, a document describing the mechanism by which violations would be recorded and an agreement on establishing delegations for the meeting in Astana were circulated to the Security Council on 29 December (see S/2016/1133). Lists of those entities that had signed the various documents, and signed copies, were not provided at that time.

9. On 31 December, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2336 (2016), in which it welcomed and expressed support for the efforts by the Russian Federation and Turkey to end the violence and jump-start a political process. It also stressed the importance of the full implementation of all relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016), and noted that it looked forward to the meeting to be held in Astana, viewing it as an important part of the Syrian-led political process and an important step ahead of the resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva in February 2017.

10. In preparation for the negotiations in February 2017, the Secretary-General wrote to the Presidents of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Turkey on

5 January to express United Nations support for their efforts and to underline the shared goal of preparing the Syrian parties to negotiate genuinely and constructively on the establishment and executive powers of a credible and inclusive governance arrangement that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them to independently and democratically determine their own future. Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva Communiqué remain the foundation of and contain the guiding principles for United Nations mediation efforts in this regard.

11. From 11 to 13 January 2017, representatives of armed opposition groups met in Ankara, under the auspices of Turkey, to discuss preparations for the talks in Astana, including proposals for the agenda to be focused on ceasefire consolidation and the formation of a joint delegation. Contacts among officials of the guarantors of the talks were continuing as at the time of writing, including with Syrian and regional interlocutors. While stating the Government's commitment to negotiating any issues in Astana, the President, Bashar Al-Assad, and his senior officials also made public statements during the reporting period to the effect that the State would not relent until it had regained "every last inch" of Syrian territory.

12. The ceasefire regime between the Government and armed opposition groups, which began on 30 December, excludes areas of combat operations against groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist organizations, namely ISIL and the Nusra Front (now calling itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham). Indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, in particular against medical personnel and facilities, and against schools, education staff and schoolchildren, continued to be reported in December, with some such reports being received after the ceasefire went into effect.

13. The reporting period witnessed intense military activity by the Government, focused on the reassertion of authority over the entirety of the city of Aleppo. After an intensive military campaign to retake eastern parts of the city, an agreement was reached through joint Russian-Turkish efforts on 14 December to evacuate fighters and civilians wishing to leave. This came after just over five months of government besiegement, a major offensive in November, during which government forces and their allies took 95 per cent of territory controlled by the armed opposition in the city and occasions on which leaflets were dropped threatening the "annihilation" of those who remained in opposition-controlled areas. Beforehand, there were reports that armed opposition groups were preventing civilians from fleeing from the areas that they controlled. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic also registered allegations of torture and execution made by residents fleeing from eastern Aleppo. The evacuation of thousands of individuals from eastern parts of Aleppo to the western countryside began on 15 December, but stalled repeatedly amid reports of convoys coming under fire, evacuation routes being cut off by pro-government militias, individuals being removed from buses leaving eastern Aleppo, summary executions and an additional government demand, not part of the original agreement, that evacuations from eastern Aleppo would be conditional on evacuations from two towns besieged by armed opposition groups: Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib governorate. A second agreement was reached on 18 December, resulting in 32,556 fighters and civilians being evacuated from the eastern part of Aleppo to the western countryside and 1,228 individuals being evacuated from Fu'ah and Kafraya to the western part of Aleppo. A convoy of

empty buses en route to these towns to support the evacuations was attacked at a checkpoint by armed opposition groups on 18 December. No further evacuations from Fu'ah and Kafraya have since occurred, nor have they occurred in relation to the government-besieged towns of Madaya and Zabadani, which are the other two towns part of the Four Towns Agreement.

14. A high tempo of military activity continued elsewhere in the country, mostly as a result of attempts by government forces to advance territorially, especially in remaining pockets controlled by the armed opposition around Damascus. Fierce battles were reported in Damascus, after a government offensive on the eastern Ghouta and the strategic area of Wadi Barada, located between the capital and the border with Lebanon. As a result of the fighting in Wadi Barada, 7,000 residents were displaced and water supplies to Damascus and surrounding areas were disrupted from 22 December, leaving more than 5.5 million people with only minimal access to water. Mortar shells were reportedly fired by the armed opposition towards the vicinity of the Russian embassy and United Nations offices in Damascus. Government forces also advanced in Dar'a, while clashes between government forces and armed opposition groups took place in Homs and Hama. Air strikes were reported in Hama, Homs, Idlib and Ladhqiyyah governorates, including on two schools in Idlib. Shelling and missile and mortar attacks were reported in Dar'a, Hama, Idlib and Ladhqiyyah governorates.

15. ISIL lost territory to separate offensives by Turkish-backed armed opposition groups and the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces, but gained territory from government forces. ISIL retook the town of Tadmur (Palmyra), Homs governorate, on 11 December. On the same day, the Syrian Democratic Forces declared the beginning of phase II of the operation known as "Wrath of the Euphrates", aimed at seizing Raqqah from ISIL. Over the subsequent weeks, they took control of 97 villages, while air strikes by the United States-led international coalition destroyed four bridges, thereby cutting ISIL supply lines. The Turkish military and armed opposition groups linked to the Turkish military operation known as "Euphrates Shield" continued their offensive to expel ISIL from Bab, north-eastern Aleppo governorate, making some progress. On 14 January 2017, ISIL launched a massive attack on government military installations around the city of Dayr al-Zawr, threatening to cut off the city from the military airport, which had been used to supply humanitarian assistance.

16. The delivery of humanitarian assistance proved extremely challenging in many areas of the Syrian Arab Republic. My monthly reports on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) provide a more detailed overview of the humanitarian situation on a regular basis.

17. The main focus of the humanitarian response by the United Nations and its partners was on supporting the some 150,000 people displaced from formerly besieged areas of eastern Aleppo. More than 110,000 people registered in government-controlled areas and, between 15 and 22 December, 36,000 people were evacuated to the western Aleppo countryside and Idlib. The United Nations contributed to observing the evacuation of buses and ambulances and provided life-saving assistance to those who were displaced from or who have since returned to eastern Aleppo, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2328 (2016).

18. Access to the millions of people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas remained of critical concern. As a result of delays in the issuance of facilitation letters, requirements for additional government and security approvals above and beyond the two steps agreed to with the Government in April, lack of adherence to agreed-upon protocols at checkpoints and insecurity, only two inter-agency convoys were deployed: one on 16 December, providing assistance to some 6,000 people in Khan al-Shih, Rif Dimashq governorate, and one in January, reaching besieged Mu'addamiyah with multisectoral assistance for some 45,000 people. The Government continued to provide basic services to those areas under its control and in many areas beyond its control.

19. In addition to inter-agency road convoys, the United Nations provided assistance to besieged and hard-to-reach areas through single-agency convoys, airdrops and airlifts. Non-governmental organizations continued to provide medical, education and protection services, as well as some support in other sectors, in hard-to-reach locations under extremely challenging circumstances. From 10 April to the end of December, the United Nations completed 170 airdrops of food commodities and humanitarian assistance over the city of Dayr al-Zawr. In addition, the logistics cluster continued airlifts to Qamishli from Damascus, with 254 airlift rotations having been completed since 9 July as a result of the continued closure of the Nusaybin/Qamishli crossing by the Turkish authorities for security reasons.

20. The removal of life-saving medicines and medical supplies from humanitarian aid convoys continued throughout December. Life-saving and life-sustaining medical items sufficient for 23,207 treatments were removed by government forces from the inter-agency convoy to Khan al-Shih. The situation in the besieged neighbourhood of Wa'r in Homs, the city's last opposition-controlled neighbourhood, is also of great concern. A joint humanitarian assessment undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Wa'r on 7 December found a need for immediate humanitarian intervention to prevent the people of the neighbourhood from facing acute shortages of basic and life-saving materials and the collapse of the already severely limited medical services. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also reported two ground-based strikes on civilian infrastructure in the neighbourhood — an elementary school and a charity working with orphans — during December. There had previously been reports of shelling from Wa'r into other parts of Homs.

21. Under the United Nations inter-agency convoy plan for December, access was requested to 21 locations, including besieged locations, with the aim of reaching 930,250 people. In their response on 1 December, the Syrian authorities approved access to 798,200 of those requested beneficiaries (85.8 per cent). On 19 December, the United Nations submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the inter-agency convoy plan for January 2017, which comprised 19 requests to reach 914,000 people in need across 21 besieged, hard-to-reach and priority cross-line areas. A response was received on 29 December, authorizing 697,700 beneficiaries (76.3 per cent).

22. During the evacuations from Aleppo, Fu'ah and Kafraya, there were reports of unlawful attacks involving civilians. The United Nations received credible reports of pro-government forces in western Aleppo stopping a 20-bus convoy of

800 people on 16 December. Two fighters and a member of the civil defence were reportedly killed. All valuables, along with identity cards and mobile phones, were removed from the individuals in the convoy. The men were forced to lie face down and insulted and beaten. After approximately four hours, the convoy was allowed to proceed, except for 14 people who were ordered to return to eastern Aleppo, along with the bodies of the three men killed. On 18 December, a convoy of empty buses en route to the besieged towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya was attacked by armed opposition groups at a checkpoint in Sarmin, some 15 km to the south of the towns. The group known as the Soldiers of al-Aqsa said that it had set eight buses alight. A driver who was attempting to escape was killed. Seven other drivers have since reportedly been detained by the Soldiers of al-Aqsa. Ultimately, the evacuations from Fu'ah and Kafraya were initiated, but 15 buses were able to evacuate only 1,226 people from the towns. A total of 23 buses and their drivers that had entered the towns to undertake further evacuations remained stranded inside the besieged area after negotiations broke down and they were not permitted to leave.

23. In blatant disregard for the protected status of medical facilities under international humanitarian law, further articulated by the Security Council in its resolution 2286 (2016), such facilities continued to be damaged or destroyed as a result of fighting. The United Nations and health partners received credible reports of 12 attacks against medical facilities in December, comprising 4 on hospitals (2 in Aleppo, 1 in Dar'a and 1 in Idlib), 2 on primary health-care centres (1 each in Aleppo and Rif Dimashq), 1 on a mobile field hospital (Aleppo) and 5 on ambulances (4 in Rif Dimashq and 1 in Aleppo).

24. Two attacks on education facilities were reported by the United Nations during the reporting period. On 22 December, a school in Atarib, Aleppo, was hit by an air strike and partially damaged. On the same day, sporadic shelling occurred in the city of Dar'a, with a mortar bomb landing near the Kafr Kina governmental school during an afternoon shift run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. One Agency teacher was injured and taken to hospital and the school evacuated. Following the reinstatement of control over eastern Aleppo, the Government reported discovering that schools had been used for military purposes. On 9 January 2017, the municipal authorities in Aleppo announced the partial repair of 17 schools in eastern neighbourhoods, with a total of 3,825 pupils resuming their studies after the holidays.

25. The United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into the attack on a United Nations-Syrian Arab Red Crescent relief operation to Urum al-Kubra on 19 September submitted its report on 16 December. At least 10 individuals died and 22 were injured, 17 trucks were affected and most of the humanitarian supplies carried by the convoy were damaged or destroyed during the attack, with losses to the United Nations country team totalling almost \$650,000.

26. The United Nations released to the public a summary on 21 December, which was also brought to the attention of the Security Council (see S/2016/1093). In the public summary, the United Nations stated that, between 1915 and 1945 hours local time on 19 September, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent compound in Urum al-Kubra had been subject to an attack from the air, using multiple types of munitions deployed from more than one aircraft and aircraft type. The munitions used included non-precision unitary bombs and/or smaller blast-incendiary air-to-ground weapons,

which could have been missiles, rockets or sub-munition bomblets. The Board noted that aircraft operating as part of the forces of the international coalition, the Russian Federation and the Syrian air force had the capabilities needed to carry out such an attack. It found that no party had alleged the involvement of international coalition forces aircraft and, accordingly, their involvement was highly unlikely. In addition, it stated that it had received reports that information existed to the effect that the Syrian air force was highly likely to have perpetrated the attack but was unable to draw a definitive conclusion in the absence of access to relevant raw data.

27. Since its establishment, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has produced reports documenting patterns of human rights violations and abuses, as well as the extent of the crimes committed by the Government, armed opposition groups and terrorist organizations, in particular ISIL.

28. The findings of the Commission of Inquiry indicate that flagrant human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law are continuing unabated, aggravated by blatant impunity. Murder, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, together with summary executions, are widely committed by all sides, in particular against persons deprived of their liberty. Government forces, armed opposition groups and terrorist groups have directed attacks against civilians, hospitals, medical personnel, schools and education facilities, which have resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. The parties to the conflict employ sieges and consequent starvation, denial of humanitarian access and other forms of deprivation as instruments of war to force surrender or to extract political concessions. Such acts may constitute violations of the laws of war and customs of law, amounting to war crimes.

29. The Commission of Inquiry has also reported on crimes committed against the Yazidi community, indicating that more than 3,000 women and children are held by ISIL, mostly in the Syrian Arab Republic, where Yazidi women and girls are sexually enslaved, sold in markets and otherwise abused, while Yazidi children are forcibly transferred from their own families, thereby cutting them off from the beliefs and practices of their own religious community and erasing their identity as Yazidis. Young boys are placed with ISIL fighters, indoctrinated and forced to commit crimes, including murder, against members of their own family. According to the Commission, the public statements and conduct of ISIL and its fighters clearly demonstrate that ISIL intended to destroy the Yazidis of Sinjar (Iraq), in whole or in part, and that ISIL may be responsible for genocide.

30. According to the Commission of Inquiry, while initiatives have been taken by the Government to investigate crimes committed in the context of the crisis, it was unable to identify any case of successful prosecution of any military or security force commanders or civilian superiors who bore responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross human rights violations committed since March 2011. Similarly, no credible information has been received about armed opposition groups investigating, prosecuting and punishing members alleged to have committed crimes and abuses.

31. The repeated calls for the Security Council to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court notwithstanding, initiatives in this regard have thus far failed. A lack of accountability at the national and

international levels and a climate of impunity have clearly encouraged the commission of further human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.

### **III. Recommendations on ways and means to protect civilians in the Syrian Arab Republic**

32. The protection of civilians is a significant area of concern in the Syrian Arab Republic, with some 13.5 million people in need of protection and assistance. The large number of civilian deaths and injuries reflects the continuing failure by all parties to the conflict to adhere to the laws of armed conflict, including by launching indiscriminate attacks and flouting the principles of proportionality, precautions in attack and precautions against the effects of attacks. Reports of the use of cluster munitions, incendiary phosphorous munitions, barrel bombs, bunker-busting bombs and chemical weapons in densely populated civilian areas persist. Civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, emergency response facilities and personnel and drinking water, has also reportedly been targeted by air strikes by the Government and allied forces. Civilians, along with those placed hors de combat, are regularly subjected to violence, including murder, cruel treatment and torture, together with extrajudicial executions and other reprisals, as a result of their perceived support for opposition forces. The denial of essential items necessary for the survival of civilians, such as water, medicine and foodstuffs, is regularly used as a tactic of warfare. Conditions are also placed on the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of the sick and wounded in violation of the requirement to allow the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

33. Human rights are also regularly violated or abused. Civilians are regularly arbitrarily deprived of their liberty without being afforded the right to a fair trial. Many are held for years under such conditions — often while subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment — and some forcibly disappeared.

34. The United Nations has identified additional protection concerns, along with ways and means to address them, which could help civilians to cope with the conflict and its effects. The following is a summary of the main recommendations, as elaborated by the United Nations system. The recommendations are addressed to Member States, in particular the Syrian Arab Republic, and other actors on the ground and those who have clear influence over them.

35. All parties must immediately and strictly abide by the laws of armed conflict. In particular, the launching of indiscriminate attacks and the use of indiscriminate or prohibited weapons must cease. All should refrain from directing attacks on or causing collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects, including medical units and personnel, humanitarian personnel, United Nations premises, humanitarian vehicles and relief supplies and cultural property. Furthermore, military objectives should not be placed in or near densely populated areas. No siege denying items essential for civilian survival should be imposed. It is essential to protect the right to life of fighters who have surrendered, laid down their weapons, are sick or wounded or are otherwise hors de combat. Medical assistance must be provided to all, civilians and fighters alike, without discrimination. Available best practices of notification of the location of civilian infrastructure in order to prevent attacks and

ensure accountability for such attacks should be explored and applied. In addition, Member States that provide support to parties to the conflict should use their influence to seek an immediate end to attacks on civilian areas that kill and maim civilians, including children, and damage and destroy civilian infrastructure, including medical and education facilities.

36. With regard to international human rights law, the Government holds the primary obligation to protect and uphold the human rights of all civilians in the country. It also has a clear obligation not to violate the human rights of civilians in areas over which it does not exert its authority. The behaviour of armed opposition groups should be measured against the basic tenets and principles of international human rights law. All parties to the conflict are thus called upon to respect the right to life of all civilians, to uphold the right to liberty and security of the person, including by refraining from any acts that may constitute arbitrary deprivation of liberty or enforced disappearance, and to ensure that no one is subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As the human rights duty bearer, the Government has an obligation to ensure that those whom it accuses of criminal offences are afforded a trial that offers all judicial guarantees. No person may be criminally sanctioned for peacefully exercising their freedom of expression, association and assembly. The Government also has an obligation to ensure that any security measures imposed on civilians leaving areas under the control of armed opposition groups strictly comply with international law. There must be no discrimination on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, race, sex, language, social origin or political belief.

37. With regard to identity-based violence and divisive rhetoric, which have increasingly and alarmingly been manifested in the Syrian conflict and continue to be fuelled by outside actors, all civilians, regardless of their religion, community or ethnic affiliation, must be protected. The Government and armed opposition groups, in both areas that they control and those that they do not, have a legal responsibility and obligation, in addition to a clear moral responsibility, to do so. Violence on the basis of religious, communal or ethnic affiliation, in addition to divisive rhetoric, must cease immediately. Both the Government and armed opposition groups, together with their regional and international supporters, must do their utmost to avoid and prevent rifts along ethnic and religious lines. The media has an important role to play in defusing tensions. In addition, intercommunal tensions and their historic root causes should be addressed through political dialogue, while comprehensive community dialogue should be part of any reconciliation process to promote long-term peace and ensure inclusive and participatory politics.

38. With regard to humanitarian access, displacement, freedom of movement and sieges, permanent and unhindered access must be provided to all humanitarian actors by the most practical routes, including across borders, and without conditions, so as to independently assess needs and provide the necessary services to those affected by the crisis, in particular where control over populated areas has recently changed hands. During the provision of aid, due attention should be given to ensuring the presence of female humanitarian staff so as to safeguard its inclusive distribution. Everyone must refrain from committing acts that may violate the prohibition on the forced displacement of civilians unless such displacement is necessary to guarantee their security. In such cases, civilians must be allowed to return home as soon as the conditions necessitating their displacement cease. If the

property of the displaced has been appropriated by others, as has been reported in the formerly besieged town of Darayya, which has since been populated by Iraqi families, all property must be returned to its original owner. It is imperative that the property rights of displaced persons be respected and that displaced persons have the right to voluntarily return, in safety, to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as is feasible. All efforts must be made to ensure family unity and the protection of vulnerable persons such as women and children during displacement, together with the provision of satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

39. Women and girls should not be forced to adhere to measures that may de facto limit their freedom of movement. The use of siege should immediately end, thereby allowing freedom of movement — civilian, humanitarian and commercial — and access for medical personnel and supplies, while also ensuring that others in need of assistance are not overlooked on account of political pressure to deliver aid to specific areas. Countries neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic and beyond are expected to allow all civilians fleeing persecution and war to have access to their territory, realizing that the obligations of States towards such displaced persons begin at their borders.

40. Those arbitrarily detained or abducted should be released immediately, along with vulnerable cases on humanitarian grounds. Those detained hors de combat should be treated humanely, bearing in mind the specific obligation in relation to detained women and children, in addition to the need for special measures to be applied to armed actors seeking to surrender, disarm or defect. The Government should provide neutral and impartial international humanitarian agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, with immediate and unhindered access to detainees, abductees and detention facilities so that they can monitor the treatment of detainees and the conditions of detention. All detainees must be afforded their human rights; in particular, the Government and other parties to the conflict must meet their obligations to treat detainees humanely and protect them from any form of ill-treatment or torture. They must be informed of the reasons for their detention and be promptly brought before an independent court to review the lawfulness of that detention.

41. With regard to child recruitment, marriage and labour, all Syrian, regional and international actors are strongly urged to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children under 18 years of age in conflict, in both combat and non-combat roles, including for the purpose of sexual exploitation. It is critical that any peace talks include dedicated discussions around specific measures towards this end, with a view to reaching commitments to preventing children from participating in hostilities or being associated with parties to the conflict in other ways, expediting the release of children currently associated with armed forces or groups and ensuring the existence of and facilitating access to services with a view to reintegrating children into civilian life. There should also be an end to practices whereby women and girls are requested to be or are married as forms of payment or negotiation.

42. With regard to sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, all parties to the armed conflict that have been listed in my most recent annual report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2016/361/Rev.1) must

immediately cease the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war or terror. They must make credible, public and time-bound commitments to combating sexual violence and implement specific commitments to undertaking timely investigations of alleged abuses in accordance with Security Council resolution 1960 (2010). All parties to the conflict must take measures to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and ensure that survivors have safe access to the required services, including health and psychosocial care and socioeconomic reintegration and livelihood support, including by making those services available where they do not exist. Provisions should be made for women with children born as a result of wartime rape. Member States receiving displaced persons from the Syrian Arab Republic should give special consideration to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in their asylum processes.

43. Concerning the threat posed by explosive remnants of war, all parties should allow the clearance of such remnants, safely conduct risk education activities and ensure respect for and the safety of humanitarian staff conducting clearance activities.

44. Given the challenges relating to the loss or absence of civil and property documentation, including in cases of births in places of displacement, efforts are needed to encourage access to such documentation, including remotely and in areas under the control of armed opposition groups, as well as the non-penalization of and non-discrimination against individuals on the basis of the documents that they are able to obtain, such as those issued by government entities or alternative authorities in areas outside government control. Birth registration should be accorded priority. The movement of civilians without documentation should be facilitated in urgent humanitarian cases, and without discrimination on the basis of the type of documents within reach. In addition, safe mechanisms for property restitution should be established for persons returning to those areas to which ceasefire agreements apply and who find their houses occupied.

45. On matters of accountability for crimes involving violations of international law, all parties to the conflict must abide by their obligation to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute any personnel under their command for suspected violations of international law. All parties to the conflict should be reminded that they share the responsibility to comply with their obligations under international law. In addition, all are encouraged to continue efforts to document the conduct of hostilities, including by cooperating with and facilitating the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

#### **IV. Conclusions**

46. Resolution 71/130 was adopted amid grave concern among Member States over the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and against the backdrop of intensifying operations to retake eastern Aleppo. After prolonged divisions on issues relating to the conflict, the latter part of December marked an important moment of

renewed unity in the Security Council, as evidenced by the unanimous adoption of resolutions 2328 (2016), 2332 (2016) and 2336 (2016). It is to be hoped, in the period ahead, that unity can be further extended and deepened, both in the Council and in the region.

47. The announcement, on 29 December, by the Russian Federation and Turkey of an agreement on a nationwide cessation of hostilities between the Government and armed opposition groups is welcome. A comprehensive cessation of hostilities remains the cornerstone of the framework laid down in Security Council resolution 2254 (2015).

48. The United Nations remains concerned, however, about reports of continued armed conflict. Full adherence to the ceasefire agreement by all parties is of crucial importance in saving civilian lives and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Those Member States with influence over the parties to the conflict should, therefore, deploy their good offices to ensure respect for the agreement and an end to the fighting.

49. Only a political solution can bring the conflict and the continued suffering of the people in the Syrian Arab Republic to an end. A surge in diplomacy is required. The meeting in Astana resulted in agreement by Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation and Turkey to establish a trilateral mechanism to observe and ensure full compliance with the ceasefire. Consolidating the ceasefire and saving Syrian lives is the immediate priority, and the United Nations stands ready to assist in the establishment of the mechanism. The emphasis of the meeting on the ceasefire will help to create a supportive environment for the resumption of intra-Syrian negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations. As all participants in the meeting in Astana reaffirmed, and as mandated by the Security Council in its resolutions, the United Nations retains the lead on the mediation process. It will be important to maintain this clarity in order to ensure meaningful negotiations. The only sustainable solution can come through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, as endorsed by the Council in its resolution 2118 (2013) and reiterated in its resolutions 2254 (2015), 2268 (2016) and 2336 (2016), and relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group.

50. The United Nations will spare no effort to help Syrians to determine a path, backed by united international support, to the negotiating table and to move towards a democratic political system, with equal rights for all. The Special Envoy for Syria, in close consultation with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and with the personal engagement and support of the Secretary-General, is actively preparing the next meeting in Geneva, planned for February 2017. With energies focused on convening intra-Syrian negotiations, it is expected that the Russian Federation and Turkey, as guarantors of the existing ceasefire, as well as other members of the international community, including in the region, will do their utmost to urge the parties to the conflict to engage constructively and genuinely in order to rapidly agree on comprehensive and sustainable results to put an end to the conflict and set the Syrian Arab Republic on a path of genuine and irreversible political transition.

51. Innocent civilians, including women and children, continue to be the primary victims of the vicious vortex of protracted conflict, terrorism and violent extremism. Their protection requires an urgent and more concerted response from the Security

Council and the wider international community. The lack of a sustainable resolution of the conflict has contributed to the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism in the Syrian Arab Republic and throughout the region. The recent military successes notwithstanding, ISIL and Al-Qaida-related terrorist groups continue to control territory, resources and population centres, undermining Syrian security and stability. Furthermore, the presence of foreign terrorist fighters from around the world, who have no interest in the resolution of the conflict, continues to pose a serious danger, not only to Syrian civilians, but also to people in their home countries and abroad. Effective efforts to combat terrorism require unity of action on the part of the entire international community. In addition, sustainably tackling this scourge requires a political settlement that addresses the root causes of the crisis and the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, together with effective accountability measures.

52. The deterioration of the respect for international law relating to the protection of civilians, with increasingly brazen violations during the conflict, has been of grave concern to the United Nations, to the world and to the Secretary-General himself. Violations have been committed by many parties, but none more so than the Government. The Government and its allies have reportedly targeted hospitals, emergency response facilities and personnel, drinking water, food stocks and other civilian infrastructure, often in clear violation of international norms of proportionality. The use of cluster munitions, incendiary phosphorous munitions, barrel bombs, bunker-busting bombs and chemical weapons in densely populated civilian areas is unprecedented in modern times. There are credible reports that thousands of people are being held in detention without due process, in unacceptable conditions and subject to torture on a massive scale. Monitoring mechanisms must be put in place to prevent further abuses, arbitrary detentions and disappearances. It behoves the entire international community to investigate and hold those responsible for such atrocities to account.

53. Member States, all parties to the conflict and civil society are called upon to cooperate fully with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, so that they may fulfil their respective mandates effectively, and, in particular, to provide them with any information and documentation that they may possess, as well as any other form of assistance pertaining to their mandates. Such support is necessary for the Mechanism to begin to function fully.

54. As Syrians approach the end of the sixth year of the war and devastation in their land, it is critical that efforts be redoubled to help them to end the bloodshed and create a sustainable horizon for rebuilding their lives and peace. In working towards helping Syrians to jointly craft and implement critical nationwide initiatives relating to a cessation of violence, political transition and reconstruction, it is equally pressing to help them to address the multitude of protection concerns that have emerged and continue to affect them in their daily lives.

55. It is hoped that the recommendations on ways and means to protect civilians, described herein at the request of the General Assembly, will be studied and taken on board by Syrian, regional and international actors, with a view to immediate

action thereon. Most urgently, there must be a concerted effort to insist that the parties to the conflict uphold the norms of international humanitarian and human rights law, including by putting an end to the use of besiegement and of indiscriminate weaponry in civilian areas.

56. The Syrian Arab Republic exemplifies the most disconcerting peace and security crisis of current times, the consequences and implications of which are extremely serious for the country, the region and the wider international arena. The Secretary-General is committed to addressing this devastating conflict with determination, constructively and creatively, and stands ready to engage in whichever way he can to contribute personally to finding a sustainable solution to the crisis. An end to the suffering in the Syrian Arab Republic and the stabilization and reconstruction of the country will be achieved only by means of a sustainable political solution that enjoys widespread support among the Syrian people and the international community.

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# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
3 February 2017

Original: English

Seventy-first session  
Agenda item 140  
Joint Inspection Unit

## Report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2016

### Note by the Secretary-General

1. The present note was prepared pursuant to paragraph 17 of General Assembly resolution 65/270, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), to expedite the implementation of that resolution, including through the expected provision of support to the Joint Inspection Unit by the secretariats of the participating organizations in the preparation of its reports, notes and confidential letters, and through the consideration of and action on the recommendations of the Unit in the light of pertinent resolutions of the Assembly, and to report to the Assembly on an annual basis on the results achieved.

2. In accordance with the statute of the Unit, the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chair of CEB and through the secretariat of CEB, performs functions that support the work of the Unit, mainly in the preparation of reports that concern more than one organization.

3. In accordance with the mandate of the Unit, once a report on an issue of a system-wide nature has been finalized by the Unit, the secretariat of CEB circulates it to United Nations system organizations that are members of the Unit. The secretariat requests the organizations to make comments on the final version of the report, including on the methodology used by the Unit during its preparation and the content and value of the recommendations made therein. Although each organization addresses the recommendations within the framework of its governing bodies, the comments, which are collated and issued as United Nations documents under cover of a note by the Secretary-General, reflect the overall consensus of the United Nations system. During this process, and as a matter of normal practice, the secretariat requests organizations to respond within the deadline provided in order to produce the comments of the Secretary-General and those of CEB members within the mandated time frame. In this regard, during 2016 the secretariats of CEB and of the Unit continued constructive dialogues regarding the timely preparation of the notes by the Secretary-General containing those comments.



4. In addition to preparing the note by the Secretary-General on reports of the Unit on issues of system-wide concern, the secretariat of CEB continues to work closely with the Unit on the preparation of its annual programme of work. It provides substantive input regarding specific proposals and facilitates the process as requested by the secretariat of the Unit.
  5. The secretariats of CEB and the Unit continue to engage in a dialogue that ensures a smooth report preparation process as the Unit maintains its focus on issues of a system-wide nature. In 2016, for example, the secretariat of CEB provided input for the review of the acceptance and implementation of Joint Inspection Unit recommendations that had been directed at CEB (JIU/ML/2016/25). In addition, the High-level Committee on Management, through its Information and Communication Technology Network, provided input for the preparation of the Unit's report on knowledge management in the United Nations system.
  6. In 2016 the Secretary-General, in consultation with members of CEB and in accordance with procedures set out in chapter 2, article 3, of the statute of the Unit, reviewed the qualifications of inspectors proposed to fill a vacancy that occurred in 2016, as well as for vacancies that will occur at the end of 2017.
  7. The Secretary-General remains committed to maintaining a close working relationship with the Unit and encourages all organizations to respond in a timely manner and in a spirit of cooperation to its requests.
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## General Assembly

Distr.: General  
3 February 2017

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**Seventy-first session**

Agenda item 121

**Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly**

### **Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly**

#### **Report of the Secretary-General**

1. By its resolution 70/305, the General Assembly decided to establish, at its seventy-first session, an ad hoc working group on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly, open to all Member States.
2. In paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit an update on the provisions of the Assembly resolutions on revitalization addressed to the Secretariat for implementation that had not been implemented, with an indication of the constraints and reasons behind any lack of implementation, for further consideration by the Ad Hoc Working Group at the seventy-first session.
3. The present report is being issued pursuant to that mandate (see annex).



## Annex

# Updated inventory chart of General Assembly resolutions on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly, issued pursuant to resolution 70/305

## Provisions requiring follow-up

| No. | Resolution       | Text of provision                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Implementing entity | Comments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-----|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.  | 70/305, para. 33 | <i>Reiterates</i> the need to fully implement and observe rule 55 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which provides that during the sessions of the Assembly the <i>Journal of the United Nations</i> shall be published in the languages of the Assembly, expresses its concern about the lack of implementation of rule 55, and in this regard requests the Secretary-General to provide during the seventy-first session of the Assembly innovative proposals on the possible changes to the format, production and editing of the Journal, by reallocating existing resources and economizing on the costs of publishing it. | Secretariat         | <p>A similar mandate was included in paragraph 41 of resolution 69/324 on multilingualism. At the time, the General Assembly was informed that the current practice, which is to publish the Journal in the six languages of the Assembly during the main parts of the Assembly, from September to December, and in English and French only during the remainder of the year, would not require additional resources.</p> <p>At the following session, the issue was discussed under the revitalization item and consequently included in resolution 70/305. In accordance with that resolution, the Secretary-General will provide innovative proposals for consideration by Member States during the seventy-first session.</p>                           |
| 2.  | 70/305, para. 64 | <i>Requests</i> the Secretary-General to submit, in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019, proposals to review the budget allocation of the Office of the President of the General Assembly in accordance with existing procedures and bearing in mind the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General's Task Force on the functioning of the Office of the President, and in this connection looks forward to considering such proposals during the main part of its seventy-second session.                                                                                             | Secretariat         | <p>The Secretary-General had previously put forward proposals for resources relating, inter alia, to the handover and overlap costs for staff of the incoming President of the General Assembly, who usually arrive earlier to begin working in the Interim Office of the President-elect and therefore overlap with the staff of the outgoing President for several weeks (see document A/69/416, para. 13 (b) (i)), which, however, was not approved by the Assembly (see resolution 69/264).</p> <p>Pursuant to resolution 70/305, the Secretary-General intends to submit, in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019, proposals to review the budget allocation of the Office, bearing in mind the recommendations</p> |

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| <i>No.</i> | <i>Resolution</i> | <i>Text of provision</i> | <i>Implementing entity</i> | <i>Comments</i>                                                                                                                          |
|------------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|            |                   |                          |                            | contained in the report of the Secretary-General's Task Force on the functioning of the Office of the President (see document A/70/783). |

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# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
6 February 2017

Original: English

## Seventy-first session

Agenda item 160 (a)

**Financing of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the  
Middle East: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**

## **Budget for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018**

### **Report of the Secretary-General**

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## Summary

The present report contains the budget for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, which amounts to \$62,276,000.

The proposed budget in the amount of \$62,276,000 represents an increase of \$14,561,900, or 30.5 per cent, compared with the apportionment of \$47,714,100 for the 2016/17 period. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to increased requirements for the acquisition of safety and security equipment and alteration and renovation services, as well as to the higher deployment of military contingent personnel, in connection with the return of the Force to Camp Faouar, which began in November 2016, as described in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/803).

The proposed budget provides for the deployment of some 1,250 military contingent personnel, 53 international staff, including 10 temporary positions, and 82 national staff.

The total resource requirements for UNDOF for the financial period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 have been linked to the objective of the Force through a number of results-based frameworks, organized according to components (operations and support). The human resources of the Force, in terms of the number of personnel, have been attributed to the individual components, with the exception of the executive direction and management of the Force, which can be attributed to the Force as a whole.

The explanations of variances in resource levels, both human resources and financial resources, have been linked, where applicable, to specific outputs planned by the Force.

## Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars. Budget year is from 1 July to 30 June.)

| Category                                   | Expenditures<br>(2015/16) | Apportionment<br>(2016/17) | Cost estimates<br>(2017/18) | Variance        |             |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
|                                            |                           |                            |                             | Amount          | Percentage  |
| Military and police personnel              | 22 235.5                  | 22 352.2                   | 28 766.2                    | 6 414.0         | 28.7        |
| Civilian personnel                         | 14 177.6                  | 14 331.2                   | 14 347.7                    | 16.5            | 0.1         |
| Operational costs                          | 14 654.5                  | 11 030.7                   | 19 162.1                    | 8 131.4         | 73.7        |
| <b>Gross requirements</b>                  | <b>51 067.6</b>           | <b>47 714.1</b>            | <b>62 276.0</b>             | <b>14 561.9</b> | <b>30.5</b> |
| Staff assessment income                    | 1 303.7                   | 1 395.6                    | 1 388.2                     | (7.4)           | (0.5)       |
| <b>Net requirements</b>                    | <b>49 763.9</b>           | <b>46 318.5</b>            | <b>60 887.8</b>             | <b>14 569.3</b> | <b>31.5</b> |
| Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) | —                         | —                          | —                           | —               | —           |
| <b>Total requirements</b>                  | <b>51 067.6</b>           | <b>47 714.1</b>            | <b>62 276.0</b>             | <b>14 561.9</b> | <b>30.5</b> |

**Human resources<sup>a</sup>**

|                                           | <i>Military<br/>contingent<sup>b</sup></i> | <i>International<br/>staff</i> | <i>National<br/>staff</i> | <i>Temporary<br/>positions<sup>c</sup></i> | <i>Total</i> |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------|
| <b>Executive direction and management</b> |                                            |                                |                           |                                            |              |
| Approved 2016/17                          | —                                          | 7                              | —                         | 2                                          | 9            |
| Proposed 2017/18                          | —                                          | 8                              | —                         | 2                                          | 10           |
| <b>Components</b>                         |                                            |                                |                           |                                            |              |
| <b>Operations</b>                         |                                            |                                |                           |                                            |              |
| Approved 2016/17                          | 1 250                                      | —                              | —                         | —                                          | 1 250        |
| Proposed 2017/18                          | 1 250                                      | —                              | —                         | —                                          | 1 250        |
| <b>Support</b>                            |                                            |                                |                           |                                            |              |
| Approved 2016/17                          | —                                          | 35                             | 88                        | 6                                          | 129          |
| Proposed 2017/18                          | —                                          | 35                             | 82                        | 8                                          | 131          |
| <b>Total</b>                              |                                            |                                |                           |                                            |              |
| Approved 2016/17                          | 1 250                                      | 42                             | 88                        | 8                                          | 1 388        |
| Proposed 2017/18                          | 1 250                                      | 43                             | 82                        | 10                                         | 1 385        |
| <b>Net change</b>                         | —                                          | 1                              | (6)                       | 2                                          | (3)          |

<sup>a</sup> Represents highest level of authorized/proposed strength.

<sup>b</sup> Highest authorized strength for UNDOF is at some 1,250 military contingent personnel, according to the original mandate of the Force established by the Security Council in its resolution 350 (1974).

<sup>c</sup> Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.

<sup>d</sup> Funded under general temporary assistance.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section IV of the present report.

## **I. Mandate and planned results**

### **A. Overall**

1. The mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 350 (1974). The most recent extension of the mandate was authorized by the Council in its resolution 2330 (2016), by which the Council extended the mandate until 30 June 2017.
2. The Force is mandated to help the Security Council to achieve an overall objective, namely, to maintain international peace and security.
3. Within this overall objective, UNDOF will, during the budget period, contribute to a number of expected accomplishments by delivering related key outputs, shown in the frameworks below. These frameworks are organized according to components (operations and support), which are derived from the mandate of the Force.
4. The expected accomplishments would lead to the fulfilment of the objective of the Security Council within the lifetime of the Force, and the indicators of achievement show a measurement of progress towards such accomplishments during the budget period. The human resources of UNDOF in terms of the number of personnel have been attributed to the individual components, with the exception of the executive direction and management of the Force, which can be attributed to the Force as a whole. Variances in the number of personnel, compared with the approved budget for the 2016/17 period, including reclassifications, have been explained under the relevant components.
5. The Force is mandated to maintain the area of separation and to monitor the areas of limitation agreed to in the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of May 1974. The area of separation is approximately 80 km in length from north to south and varies from 12.5 km along the crest of Mount Hermon in the north to less than 400 m along the border between the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan.
6. UNDOF will continue to maintain its temporary headquarters functions in Ya'fur and Mazzah in the Damascus area, at its operational base at Camp Ziouani and at Camp Faouar. The Force will also maintain nine military positions in the area of separation.
7. Further to the reiteration of the commitment between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to the return of UNDOF to the Bravo side, the Force is returning in a phased manner to Camp Faouar and to the temporarily vacated positions on the Bravo side, pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/803).

### **B. Planning assumptions and mission support initiatives**

8. The Force has, in general, maintained the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, albeit in a continuously volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, and it will continue its best efforts

to maintain the ceasefire between the two countries to ensure that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement Agreement.

9. During the 2017/18 period, as detailed in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/803), the main priority of the Force is to renovate and return to Camp Faouar. The Force will undertake alteration and renovation projects to provide accommodation and working conditions for the military and civilian personnel to be gradually deployed to Camp Faouar. The Force will also deploy 14 additional armoured personnel carriers to support the operations on the Bravo side. Moreover, UNDOF will continue to implement its mandate by monitoring the area of separation and the ceasefire line through the use of existing electronic long-range observation equipment. In addition, the Force plans to implement a higher level of surveillance and situational awareness by the utilization of perimeter sensors, intrusion detection and closed circuit television systems. To ensure the safety and security of all UNDOF personnel, the Force plans to deploy equipment to allow the implementation of encrypted communication and tracking of vehicles and personnel through the utilization of a global positioning system.

10. The Force will continue to maintain and strengthen its military positions: five on Mount Hermon; position 80 in the southern part of the area of separation; and position 22 on the Alpha side. In addition to these positions, the Force plans to reoccupy two formerly vacated positions on the Bravo side (positions 71 and 72), resulting in a total of nine positions. The operating base of the Force will remain at Camp Ziouani, on the Alpha side, and the headquarters functions of the Force will remain in Ya'fur and its administrative office in Mazzah.

11. The Force will continue to provide support to the five fixed and four temporary observation posts of the Observer Group Golan, located west of the Alpha side.

12. During the 2017/18 period, UNDOF will conduct its operations from the aforementioned positions and will continue to base its staffing strategy on the return of the Force to Camp Faouar. As part of this strategy it is proposed to establish one post of Deputy Force Commander and to strengthen the Security Section by two international general temporary positions.

13. The Force will continue to benefit from the utilization of Umoja to automate and consolidate its various functions and streamline its processes, while maintaining compliance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.

14. The major external factor that could impede the implementation of the proposed budget is the prevailing security situation in the UNDOF area of operations.

### **C. Regional mission cooperation**

15. UNDOF will continue to work in close cooperation with the other missions in the region, receiving support from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the area of information and technology and communications services and support for its military positions and for the movement of its goods and personnel through Lebanon.

16. UNDOF will also continue to cooperate with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) by liaising with the UNTSO office in Damascus and by continuing to maintain operational control of the UNTSO military observers in the Observer Group Golan.

17. In addition, periodic meetings are planned with UNTSO, UNIFIL and with the United Nations Force in Cyprus to ensure coordination on emerging issues that have a regional impact. UNDOF will continue to provide support to the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria in Damascus.

#### D. Results-based-budgeting frameworks

18. In order to facilitate the presentation of proposed changes in human resources, six categories of possible action with respect to staffing have been identified. A definition of the terminology with respect to the six categories is contained in annex I, section A, of the present report.

##### Executive direction and management

19. Overall mission direction and management are to be provided by the immediate Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The proposed staffing complement is set out in table 1.

Table 1

#### Human resources: Office of the Force Commander, Head of Mission

|                                                   | International staff |         |         |         |               | Subtotal | National staff | Total |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|----------|----------------|-------|
|                                                   | USG-ASG             | D-2-D-1 | P-5-P-4 | P-3-P-2 | Field Service |          |                |       |
| Office of the Force Commander, Head of Mission    |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |       |
| Approved posts 2016/17                            | 1                   | —       | 1       | 2       | 1             | 5        | —              | 5     |
| Proposed posts 2017/18                            | 1                   | 1       | 1       | 2       | 1             | 5        | —              | 6     |
| Net change                                        | —                   | 1       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | 1     |
| Approved temporary positions 2016/17 <sup>a</sup> | —                   | —       | 2       | —       | —             | 2        | —              | 2     |
| Proposed temporary positions 2017/18 <sup>a</sup> | —                   | —       | 2       | —       | —             | 2        | —              | 2     |
| Net change                                        | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | —     |
| Total                                             |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |       |
| Approved 2016/17                                  | 1                   | —       | 3       | 2       | 1             | 7        | —              | 7     |
| Proposed 2017/18                                  | 1                   | 1       | 3       | 2       | 1             | 7        | —              | 8     |
| Net change                                        | —                   | 1       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | 1     |

<sup>a</sup> Funded under general temporary assistance.

*International staff: net increase of 1 post*

Table 2

**Human resources: Office of the Force Commander, Head of Mission**

|                   | <i>Change</i> | <i>Level</i> | <i>Functional title</i> | <i>Post action</i> | <i>Description</i> |
|-------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Positions         | +1            | D-1          | Deputy Force Commander  | Establishment      |                    |
| <b>Net change</b> | <b>+1</b>     |              |                         |                    |                    |

20. It is proposed that one post of Deputy Force Commander at the D-1 level, presented in table 2, be established. In the light of the return of the Force to the Bravo side and given the prevailing security situation in the UNDOF area of operations, the establishment of this post is proposed to oversee and guide the activities of the Force in terms of military and planning requirements and the political engagement roles needed to facilitate the dialogue between the parties to the Disengagement Agreement, in the absence of direct crossings between the Alpha and Bravo sides. The proposal to establish the post at the D-1 level is consistent with the United Nations policy on authority, command and control, given the military nature of the role, which requires an experienced and qualified officer able to assume the responsibilities as officer-in-charge when required.

**Component 1: operations**

21. The Force will continue to exercise responsibility for the maintenance of the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to ascertain that military forces of either party do not breach the area of separation. UNDOF will continue to liaise with the parties to help to maintain the ceasefire between the parties to the Disengagement Agreement and prevent an escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. The prevailing security situation has not been conducive for a full return of the Force to its military positions on the Bravo side. However, further to the reiteration of the commitment between Israel and Syrian Arab Republic to the return of UNDOF to the Bravo side, the Force is returning in a phased manner to Camp Faouar, to positions 71 and 72, on the Bravo side and to the positions temporarily vacated, in the north of the area of separation. The return of the Force to the temporarily vacated positions on the Bravo side is aimed at ensuring the reestablishment of an interim configuration that will allow the Force to carry out its mandate effectively. To this end, UNDOF will work to restore water, electricity, heating, communications systems and supply routes to and from the Bravo side. The Force will also undertake the clearance of mines, unexploded ordnance devices and improvised explosive devices from the areas where it is deployed to ensure the safety of its personnel.

*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

1.1 The parties act in accordance with and comply with the Disengagement Agreement

1.1.1 Maintenance of the separation of forces and areas of limitation

*Outputs*

- Weekly high-level meetings with Syrian authorities, as needed, to address issues relating to the implementation of the UNDOF mandate and to ensure cooperation
- Weekly high-level meetings with Israeli authorities, as needed, to address issues relating to the implementation of the UNDOF mandate and to ensure cooperation
- Weekly (on average) liaison meetings with the parties to the Disengagement Agreement to de-escalate tensions resulting from repeated incidents of firing by the parties across the Alpha line owing to the civil conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and to discuss measures that both parties can take to prevent such incidents
- Immediate liaison with the parties on violations of the Disengagement Agreement, including incidents that jeopardize the ceasefire
- 98,550 troop-manned position person days (30 troops x 9 positions x 365 days)
- Four-person fact-finding team available at all times to rapidly gather facts on incidents in the area of separation or areas of limitation
- Protests of all violations of the Disengagement Agreement
- Four reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council
- Gradual re-establishment of the presence of the Force in Camp Faouar and in positions 71 and 72 on the Bravo side, conditions permitting

*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

1.2 Reduced threat of mines and improvised explosive devices in the area of separation

1.2.1 No persons injured or killed by mines or unexploded ordnance (2015/16: no casualties; 2016/17: no casualties; 2017/18: no casualties)

*Outputs*

- Clearance of mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices in the area of separation and continuous checking and clearance of patrol paths used by the mission troops, as required for operational safety

*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

1.3 Increased awareness of the UNDOF mandate by the civilian population

1.3.1 No incidents of inadvertent crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians in the area of separation (2015/16: no incidents; 2016/17: no incidents; 2017/18: no incidents)

*Outputs*

- Liaison with security authorities on the Bravo side and outreach to civilians about the UNDOF mandate, including incident prevention

*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

1.4 Maintain the operational capability and readiness to reoccupy temporarily vacated positions on the Bravo side

1.4.1 Agreement by both parties on the Force's reoccupation of temporarily vacated military positions on the Bravo side

*Outputs*

- Quarterly review of the security situation in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side
- One reserve company of 134 personnel in 15 armoured personnel carriers readily available at all times to support reoccupation of temporarily vacated United Nations positions on the Bravo side
- Daily monitoring and analyses of developments in the area of operation and region

*External factors*

Security situation will improve and UNDOF will be allowed access to the area of operations

Table 3

**Human resources: component 1, operations**

| <i>Category</i>                 | <i>Total</i> |
|---------------------------------|--------------|
| <i>II. Military contingents</i> |              |
| Approved 2015/16                | 1 250        |
| Proposed 2016/17                | 1 250        |
| <b>Net change</b>               | –            |

22. The military component of UNDOF comprises 1,250 military contingent personnel according to the original mandate of the Force established by the Security Council in its resolution 350 (1974). The most recent extension of the mandate was authorized by the Council in its resolution 2330 (2016), which extended the mandate of UNDOF until 30 June 2017.

**Component 2: support**

23. The component is tasked with providing rapid, effective, efficient and responsible services to support mandate implementation through the delivery of related outputs, service improvements and efficiency gains.

24. Support will be provided for the authorized strength of 1,250 military contingent personnel and for the proposed civilian staffing of 53 international staff, including 10 temporary positions, and 82 national staff. The range of support will encompass all support services, including financial, logistical, engineering, transportation, personnel, administrative, procurement, supply chain and security

services. It is proposed to continue to benefit from the functionalities of Umoja in enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.

25. To improve comparability and accountability for the performance of these services, the component has strengthened its results-based-budgeting framework for the 2017/18 period.

| <i>Expected accomplishments</i>                                                  | <i>Indicators of achievement</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2.1 Rapid, effective, efficient and responsible support services for the Mission | <p>2.1.1 Cancelled prior-year budget obligations as a percentage of prior-period obligations carried forward (2015/16: 5.6 per cent; 2016/17: <math>\leq 5</math> per cent; 2017/18: <math>\leq 5</math> per cent)</p> <p>2.1.2 Average annual percentage of authorized international posts vacant (2015/16: 11 per cent; 2016/17: <math>5\pm 1</math> per cent; 2017/18: <math>5\pm 1</math> per cent)</p> <p>2.1.3 Average number of working days for post-specific recruitments, from closing of the job opening to selection, for all international staff selections (2015/16: none; 2016/17: n/a; 2017/18: <math>\leq 130</math>)</p> <p>2.1.4 Average number of working days for roster recruitments, from closing of the job opening to selection, for all international staff selections (2015/16: 66 days; 2016/17: <math>\leq 50</math>; 2017/18: <math>\leq 48</math>)</p> <p>2.1.5 Average annual percentage of female international civilian staff (2015/16: 22 per cent; 2016/17: <math>\geq 22</math> per cent; 17/18: <math>\geq 24</math> per cent)</p> <p>2.1.6 Overall score on the Department of Field Support environmental management scorecard (2015/16: n/a; 2016/17: n/a; 2017/18: 100)</p> <p>2.1.7 Percentage of all information and communications technology incidents resolved within the established targets for high, medium and low criticality (2015/16: n/a; 2016/17: <math>\geq 85</math> per cent; 2017/18: <math>\geq 85</math> per cent)</p> <p>2.1.8 Compliance with the field occupational safety risk management policy (2015/16: 20 per cent; 2016/17: 100 per cent; 2017/18: 100 per cent)</p> <p>2.1.9 Average number of days from requisition to purchase order for all systems contract procurements in the budget period (2015/16: n/a; 2016/17: <math>\leq 7</math>; 2017/18: <math>\leq 7</math>)</p> <p>2.1.10 Overall score on the Department of Field Support property management index based on 20</p> |

underlying key performance indicators (2015/16: 1,522; 2016/17:  $\geq 1,800$ ; 2017/18:  $\geq 1,800$ )

2.1.11 Percentage of contingent personnel in United Nations accommodations that are compliant with standards on 30 June, in line with memorandums of understanding (2015/16: 100 per cent; 2016/17: 100 per cent; 2017/18: 100 per cent)

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*Outputs*

**Service improvements**

- Implementation of the mission-wide environmental action plan, in line with the Department of Field Support environment strategy
- Support for the implementation of the Department of Field Support supply chain management strategy and blueprint
- Improvement in buildings, positions and infrastructure to meet the minimum operating security standards
- Refurbishment and maintenance of Camp Faouar and 2 positions in order to provide a fully functioning operating and support basis and positions to support the military component

**Budget, finance, and reporting services**

- Provision of budget, finance and reporting services for a budget of \$62.2 million, in line with delegated authority

**Civilian personnel services**

- Provision of human resources services for up to 141 authorized civilian personnel (43 international staff, 82 national staff and 10 temporary positions), including support for claims, entitlements and benefits processing, recruitment, post management, budget preparation and staff performance management, in line with delegated authority
- Provision of in-mission training courses to 204 civilian personnel and support for out-of-mission training for 93 civilian personnel
- Support for processing of 279 in-mission and 398 outside-mission travel requests for non-training purposes and 93 travel requests for training purposes for civilian personnel

**Facility, infrastructure and engineering services**

- Maintenance and repair services for 9 positions, including Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani
- Implementation of 44 construction, renovation and alteration projects
- Operation and maintenance of 42 United Nations-owned generators
- Operation and maintenance of United Nations-owned water supply and treatment facilities (3 wells/boreholes, 3 water purification plants and 2 wastewater treatment facilities)
- Provision of waste management services, including liquid and solid waste collection and disposal, in 2 sites
- Provision of laundry service in 2 sites; cleaning and ground maintenance in 2 sites

### **Fuel management services**

- Management of supply and storage of 3 million litres of petrol (1,197,300 for ground transportation and 1,774,700 for generators and other facilities) and of oil and lubricants across distribution points and storage facilities in 15 locations. UNDOF maintains 1 level I clinic in Camp Ziouani, 1 level I clinic in position 80 and 1 subclinic in Mount Hermon for personnel of UNDOF and the Observer Group Golan

### **Geospatial, information and telecommunications technology services**

- Provision of and support for 504 handheld portable radios, 560 mobile radios for vehicles and 90 base station radios
- Operation and maintenance of a network for voice, fax, video and data communications, including 1 very small aperture terminal, 6 phone exchanges, 29 microwave links, 4 broadband global area network terminals and provision of 2 mobile phone service plans
- Provision of and support for 205 computing devices and 45 printers for an average strength of 205 civilian and uniformed end users, in addition to 167 computing devices and 27 printers for connectivity of contingent personnel, as well as other common services
- Support for and maintenance of 26 local area networks and 1 wide area network
- Analysis of geospatial data covering 4,200 km<sup>2</sup>, maintenance of topographic and thematic layers and production of 220 types of maps

### **Medical services**

- Operation and maintenance of 2 medical facilities (1 level I with surgical capability) and maintenance of contractual arrangements with 2 local hospitals

### **Supply chain management services**

- Provision of planning and sourcing support for the acquisition of goods and commodities at an estimated value of \$11.3 million, in line with delegated authority
- Receipt, management and onward movement of cargo within the Force area
- Management, accounting and reporting of property, plant and equipment, financial and non-financial inventories and equipment below the threshold with a total historical cost of \$89.2 million, in line with delegated authority

### **Uniformed personnel services**

- Emplacement, rotation and repatriation of a maximum strength of 1,250 authorized military personnel (80 military staff officers and 1,170 contingent personnel)
- Inspection and verification of and reporting on contingent-owned major equipment and self-sustainment compliance for 4 military units in 2 locations
- Supply and storage of rations, combat rations and water for an average strength of 860 military contingent personnel
- Support for the processing of claims and entitlements for an average strength of 860 military contingent personnel

- Support for the processing of 90 in-mission and 80 outside-mission travel requests for non-training purposes and 15 travel requests for training purposes

#### **Vehicle management and ground transportation services**

- Operation and maintenance of 393 United Nations-owned vehicles (141 light passenger vehicles, 69 special-purpose vehicles, 7 ambulances, 108 armoured vehicles and 68 other specialized vehicles, trailers and attachments), 27 contingent-owned vehicles, 4 workshop and repair facilities and provision of transport and shuttle services

#### **Security**

- Provision of security advice, dissemination of daily security updates to UNDOF personnel and provision of situational analysis to the senior leadership of the Force, including mission threat and risk assessment for all offices and camps in the UNDOF area of operations and in the area of separation, including all military positions
- Provision of operational security and management of the movements of civilian personnel between Damascus, the military positions and Beirut through 240 (5 convoys a week x 4 weeks a month x 12 months) organized and closely monitored convoys
- Provision of recommendations to UNDOF leadership on the enhancement of the physical security posture of all facilities
- Provision of security training necessary for civilian personnel and military personnel under the United Nations security management system on convoy procedures and actions involving improvised explosive devices; shelter procedures and camp protection; induction briefings; building evacuation drills; and abduction/hostage incident awareness

#### **Conduct and discipline**

- Implementation of a conduct and discipline programme for all military and civilian personnel, including training, prevention, monitoring activities and recommendations on remedial action where misconduct has occurred

#### **HIV/AIDS**

- Operation and maintenance of 2 facilities for confidential HIV/AIDS testing and counselling available upon request for all mission personnel
- HIV/AIDS awareness-raising programme as part of induction training for all incoming mission personnel, including peer education

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#### *External factors*

Several factors may have an impact on the ability to deliver proposed outputs as planned, including changes in the political, security, economic and humanitarian context, other instances of force majeure, changes in the mandate during the reporting period and variance in host Government compliance with the provisions of the status of forces agreement. Vendors, contractors and suppliers will be available to deliver goods and services, as contracted by the Force, to enable it to carry out its operations

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Table 4  
Human resources: component 2, support

| V. Civilian staff                                 | International staff |         |         |         |               |          | National staff | United Nations Volunteers | Total |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|-------|
|                                                   | USG-ASG             | D-2-D-1 | P-5-P-4 | P-3-P-2 | Field Service | Subtotal |                |                           |       |
| <b>Security Section</b>                           |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved posts 2016/17                            | —                   | —       | —       | 2       | —             | 2        | —              | —                         | 2     |
| Proposed posts 2017/18                            | —                   | —       | —       | 2       | —             | 2        | —              | —                         | 2     |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | —                         | —     |
| Approved temporary positions 2016/17 <sup>a</sup> | —                   | —       | 1       | —       | 2             | 3        | —              | —                         | 3     |
| Proposed temporary positions 2017/18 <sup>a</sup> | —                   | —       | 1       | 1       | 3             | 5        | —              | —                         | 5     |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | 1       | 1             | 2        | —              | —                         | 2     |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                                   |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved 2016/17                                  | —                   | —       | 1       | 2       | 2             | 5        | —              | —                         | 5     |
| Proposed 2017/18                                  | —                   | —       | 1       | 3       | 3             | 7        | —              | —                         | 7     |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | 1       | 1             | 2        | —              | —                         | 2     |
| <b>Office of the Chief of Mission Support</b>     |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved posts 2016/17                            | —                   | 1       | 2       | 2       | 5             | 10       | 24             | —                         | 34    |
| Proposed posts 2017/18                            | —                   | 1       | 2       | 2       | 5             | 10       | 24             | —                         | 34    |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | —                         | —     |
| <b>Integrated Support Services</b>                |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved posts 2016/17                            | —                   | —       | 2       | —       | 12            | 14       | 53             | —                         | 67    |
| Proposed posts 2017/18                            | —                   | —       | 2       | —       | 12            | 14       | 47             | —                         | 61    |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | (6)            | —                         | (6)   |
| Approved temporary positions 2016/17 <sup>a</sup> | —                   | —       | —       | —       | 2             | 2        | —              | —                         | 2     |
| Proposed temporary positions 2017/18 <sup>a</sup> | —                   | —       | —       | —       | 2             | 2        | —              | —                         | 2     |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | —                         | —     |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                                   |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved 2016/17                                  | —                   | —       | 2       | —       | 14            | 16       | 53             | —                         | 69    |
| Proposed 2017/18                                  | —                   | —       | 2       | —       | 14            | 16       | 47             | —                         | 63    |
| <b>Net change</b>                                 | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | (6)            | —                         | (6)   |

| V. Civilian staff                                           | International staff |         |         |         |               |          | National staff | United Nations Volunteers | Total |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|-------|
|                                                             | USG-ASG             | D-2-D-1 | P-5-P-4 | P-3-P-2 | Field Service | Subtotal |                |                           |       |
| Regional Information and Communications Technology Services |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved posts 2016/17                                      | —                   | —       | 1       | 1       | 9             | 11       | 11             | —                         | 22    |
| Proposed posts 2017/18                                      | —                   | —       | 1       | 1       | 9             | 11       | 11             | —                         | 22    |
| Net change                                                  | —                   | —       | —       | —       | —             | —        | —              | —                         | —     |
| Total                                                       |                     |         |         |         |               |          |                |                           |       |
| Approved 2016/17                                            | —                   | 1       | 6       | 5       | 31            | 43       | 88             | —                         | 131   |
| Proposed 2017/18                                            | —                   | 1       | 6       | 6       | 32            | 45       | 82             | —                         | 127   |
| Net change                                                  | —                   | —       | —       | 1       | 1             | 2        | (6)            | —                         | (4)   |

<sup>a</sup> Funded under general temporary assistance.

*International staff: net increase of 2 posts*

*National staff: net decrease of 6 posts*

#### **Security Section**

Table 5  
**Human resources: Security Section**

|                 | <i>Change</i> | <i>Level</i>  | <i>Functional title</i>      | <i>Post action</i> | <i>Description</i> |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Positions       | +1            | P-3           | Security Information Analyst | Establishment      |                    |
|                 | +1            | Field Service | Security Assistant           | Establishment      |                    |
| <b>Subtotal</b> | <b>+2</b>     |               |                              |                    |                    |

26. It is proposed that two temporary positions, presented in table 5, be established as a result of the return of the Force to Camp Faouar. The Security Information Analyst at the P-3 level will work closely with the military component of the Force, the Department of Safety and Security and the security sections of neighbouring missions to facilitate inter-mission support. The analyst will undertake regular risk analysis on threats to the Force on all UNDOF locations, involving all civilian personnel and their residences, to ensure that the Force carries out its mandate while ensuring the safety and security of all United Nations personnel. In addition, a Security Assistant at the Field Service level will work with the military and support component of the Force and with the host Government to ensure the safe passage of personnel, goods and commercial vendors in and out of Camp Faouar on a daily basis.

### Engineering Section

Table 6

#### Human resources: Engineering Section

|                 | <i>Change</i> | <i>Level</i>             | <i>Functional title</i>         | <i>Post action</i> | <i>Description</i> |
|-----------------|---------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Posts           | -2            | National General Service | Facilities Management Assistant | Abolishment        |                    |
|                 | -1            | National General Service | Plumber                         | Abolishment        |                    |
|                 | -1            | National General Service | Carpenter                       | Abolishment        |                    |
|                 | -1            | National General Service | Generator Mechanic              | Abolishment        |                    |
| <b>Subtotal</b> | <b>-5</b>     |                          |                                 |                    |                    |

27. It is proposed that five posts, presented in table 6, be abolished. In the light of the operational requirements of the Force and the continued underutilization of these roles, it has been determined that these functions will no longer be required for the 2017/18 period.

### Transport Section

Table 7

#### Human resources: Transport Section

|                 | <i>Change</i> | <i>Level</i>             | <i>Functional title</i> | <i>Post action</i> | <i>Description</i> |
|-----------------|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Posts           | -1            | National General Service | Vehicle Technician      | Abolishment        |                    |
| <b>Subtotal</b> | <b>-1</b>     |                          |                         |                    |                    |

28. It is proposed that one post, presented in table 7, be abolished. In the light of the operational requirements of the Force and the continued underutilization of this role, it has been determined that this function will no longer be required for the 2017/18 period.

### Finance and Budget Section

29. The implementation of Umoja as a single integrated system across all missions has enabled the Organization to centralize payroll processing for all field-based national staff and uniformed personnel at the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, and the Kuwait Joint Support Office. Payroll for UNDOF national staff is processed by the Office effective November 2016. The centralization of payroll services and other entitlements requires a redistribution of finance staff from the missions affected. In that regard, one post of Finance Assistant (national General Service) has been relocated to the Kuwait duty station. This temporary arrangement will remain in effect pending a decision by the General Assembly on the global service delivery model.

## II. Financial resources

### A. Overall

(Thousands of United States dollars. Budget year is 1 July to 30 June.)

| Category                                   | Expenditures<br>(2013-14) | Appropriations<br>(2014-15) | Cost estimates<br>(2015-16) | Unmet           |             |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
|                                            |                           |                             |                             | Amount          | Percentage  |
|                                            | (1)                       | (2)                         | (3)                         | (4)=(3)-(2)     | (5)=(4)-(2) |
| <b>Military and police personnel</b>       |                           |                             |                             |                 |             |
| Military observers                         | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| Military contingents                       | 22 235.5                  | 22 352.2                    | 28 786.2                    | 6 434.0         | 28.7        |
| United Nations police                      | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| Formed police units                        | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                            | <b>22 235.5</b>           | <b>22 352.2</b>             | <b>28 786.2</b>             | <b>6 434.0</b>  | <b>28.7</b> |
| <b>Civilian personnel</b>                  |                           |                             |                             |                 |             |
| International staff                        | 8 625.2                   | 8 683.2                     | 8 684.2                     | 1.0             | 0.0         |
| National staff                             | 3 797.2                   | 3 905.9                     | 3 609.5                     | (296.4)         | (7.6)       |
| United Nations Volunteers                  | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| General temporary assistance               | 1 755.2                   | 1 742.1                     | 2 054.0                     | 311.9           | 17.9        |
| Government-provided personnel              | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                            | <b>14 177.6</b>           | <b>14 331.2</b>             | <b>14 347.7</b>             | <b>16.5</b>     | <b>0.1</b>  |
| <b>Operational costs</b>                   |                           |                             |                             |                 |             |
| Civilian electoral observers               | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| Consultants                                | 3.4                       | —                           | 11.0                        | 11.0            | —           |
| Official travel                            | 784.8                     | 629.7                       | 756.0                       | 126.3           | 20.1        |
| Facilities and infrastructure              | 7 789.2                   | 5 848.9                     | 11 733.7                    | 5 884.8         | 100.6       |
| Ground transportation                      | 1 782.8                   | 1 724.0                     | 2 154.6                     | 430.6           | 25.0        |
| Air transportation                         | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| Naval transportation                       | 17.0                      | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| Communications                             | 407.9                     | 733.3                       | 1 052.7                     | 319.4           | 43.6        |
| Information technology                     | 944.9                     | 642.3                       | 1 383.6                     | 746.3           | 116.2       |
| Medical                                    | 489.7                     | 323.7                       | 323.7                       | —               | —           |
| Special equipment                          | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| Other supplies, services and equipment     | 1 934.8                   | 1 128.8                     | 1 741.8                     | 613.0           | 54.3        |
| Quick-impact projects                      | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                            | <b>14 654.5</b>           | <b>11 930.7</b>             | <b>19 162.1</b>             | <b>8 131.4</b>  | <b>73.7</b> |
| <b>Gross requirements</b>                  | <b>51 067.6</b>           | <b>47 714.1</b>             | <b>62 276.0</b>             | <b>14 561.9</b> | <b>30.5</b> |
| Staff assessment income                    | 1 303.7                   | 1 395.6                     | 1 388.2                     | (7.4)           | (0.5)       |
| <b>Net requirements</b>                    | <b>49 763.9</b>           | <b>46 318.5</b>             | <b>60 887.8</b>             | <b>14 569.3</b> | <b>31.5</b> |
| Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) | —                         | —                           | —                           | —               | —           |
| <b>Total requirements</b>                  | <b>51 067.6</b>           | <b>47 714.1</b>             | <b>62 276.0</b>             | <b>14 561.9</b> | <b>30.5</b> |

## B. Non-budgeted contributions

30. The estimated value of non-budgeted contributions for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 is as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

| Category                                       | Estimated value |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Status-of-forces agreement <sup>a</sup>        | 536.7           |
| Voluntary contributions in kind (non-budgeted) | —               |
| <b>Total</b>                                   | <b>—</b>        |

<sup>a</sup> Inclusive of rental value of land.

## C. Vacancy factors

31. The cost estimates for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 take into account the following vacancy factors:

(Percentage)

| Category                             | Actual 2015/16 | Budgeted 2016/17 | Projected 2017/18 |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Military and police personnel</b> |                |                  |                   |
| Military contingents                 | 36.4           | 42.4             | 31.2              |
| <b>Civilian personnel</b>            |                |                  |                   |
| International staff                  | 6.8            | 5.0              | 5.0               |
| National staff                       |                |                  |                   |
| National General Service staff       | 2.1            | 5.0              | 2.5               |
| Temporary positions <sup>a</sup>     |                |                  |                   |
| International staff                  | 20.0           | 3.0              | 3.0               |

<sup>a</sup> Funded under general temporary assistance.

32. The proposed vacancy factor of 31.2 per cent for military personnel takes into account the return of the Force to Camp Faouar and the increased deployment of military contingent personnel, as well as current fiscal year-to-date average vacancy rates and historical deployment patterns. The proposed vacancy factors for civilian personnel take into account current fiscal year-to-date average rates and the proposed changes in the staff levels for the 2017/18 period, as presented in the current budget document.

#### D. Contingent-owned equipment: major equipment and self-sustainment

33. Requirements for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 are based on standard reimbursement rates for major equipment and self-sustainment in the total amount of \$4,734,800 as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

| Category                                 | Estimated amount     |                     |                  |
|------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                                          | Military contingents | Formed police units | Total            |
| Major equipment                          | 4 529.0              | —                   | 4 529.0          |
| Self-sustainment                         | 205.8                | —                   | 208.8            |
| <b>Total</b>                             | <b>4 734.8</b>       | <b>—</b>            | <b>4 734.8</b>   |
| Mission factors                          | Percentage           | Effective date      | Last review date |
| <b>A. Applicable to Mission area</b>     |                      |                     |                  |
| Extreme environmental condition factor   | 0.6                  | 1 October 2016      | 1 October 2016   |
| Intensified operational condition factor | 0.2                  | 1 October 2016      | 1 October 2016   |
| Hostile action/forced abandonment factor | 3.3                  | 1 October 2016      | 1 October 2016   |
| <b>B. Applicable to home country</b>     |                      |                     |                  |
| Incremental transportation factor        | 1.5-5.5              |                     |                  |

#### E. Training

34. The estimated resource requirements for training for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 are as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

| Category                               | Estimated amount |
|----------------------------------------|------------------|
| Consultants                            |                  |
| Training consultants                   | —                |
| Official travel                        |                  |
| Official travel, training              | 225.0            |
| Other supplies, services and equipment |                  |
| Training fees, supplies and services   | 58.0             |
| <b>Total</b>                           | <b>283.0</b>     |

35. The number of participants planned for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, compared with previous periods, is as follows:

(Number of participants)

|                       | <i>International staff</i> |                            |                             | <i>National staff</i>     |                            |                             | <i>Military and police personnel</i> |                            |                             |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                       | <i>Actual<br/>2015/16</i>  | <i>Planned<br/>2016/17</i> | <i>Proposed<br/>2017/18</i> | <i>Actual<br/>2015/16</i> | <i>Planned<br/>2016/17</i> | <i>Proposed<br/>2017/18</i> | <i>Actual<br/>2015/16</i>            | <i>Planned<br/>2016/17</i> | <i>Proposed<br/>2017/18</i> |
| Internal              | 81                         | 91                         | 87                          | 113                       | 117                        | 117                         | 2 566                                | 3 757                      | 3 813                       |
| External <sup>a</sup> | 43                         | 42                         | 51                          | 39                        | 40                         | 42                          | 28                                   | 12                         | 15                          |
| <b>Total</b>          | <b>124</b>                 | <b>133</b>                 | <b>138</b>                  | <b>152</b>                | <b>157</b>                 | <b>159</b>                  | <b>2 594</b>                         | <b>3 769</b>               | <b>3 828</b>                |

<sup>a</sup> Includes United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi and outside the mission area.

36. The training programme for the 2017/18 period comprises 62 courses with a total of 4,125 participants. The primary focus of the courses is to strengthen the substantive and technical abilities of UNDOF personnel.

37. The training programme comprises courses in finance and budget, logistics, procurement and contract management, communications and information technology, engineering, ground transportation, security, conduct and discipline, HIV awareness and human resources management.

## F. Mine detection and mine-clearing services

38. Mine detection activities and mine-clearing supplies are provided by the military contingents as part of their memorandum of understanding with the Force and are budgeted under the military group of expenditures. In previous years, a provision was made under the category of Other supplies, services and equipment to cover the need for incidental mine-clearing supplies. However, no provision is proposed under that category for the 2017/18 budget period, given that there is sufficient inventory of supplies available for utilization for the activities of the Force.

## III. Analysis of variances

39. The standard terminology applied with respect to the analysis of resources variances in this section are defined in annex I, section B, of the present report. The terminology used remains the same as in previous reports.

|                             | <i>Variance</i> |       |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| <b>Military contingents</b> | \$6 414.0       | 28.7% |

### • External: deployment military personnel

40. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to: (a) the application of a vacancy factor of 31.2 per cent in the computation of costs for military contingent personnel, compared with the factor of 42.4 per cent applied in the approved budget

for the 2016/17 period, given the return of the Force to Camp Faouar and to two positions formerly held on the Bravo side (positions 71 and 72); (b) an additional 14 armoured personnel carriers provided from contingent-owned equipment, in the light of the prevailing security situation; (c) the application of a daily single rate mission subsistence allowance of \$145 dollars for the budget period, compared with \$199 dollars during the first 30 days of deployment and \$99 after 30 days applied in the 2016/17 period, which represents a net increase of 35 per cent in the subsistence allowance rate; and (d) the increase in the overall cost of rations, given the lower proposed vacancy rate and the higher number of troops projected to be deployed to Camp Faouar, which has a higher unit cost for rations than the Alpha side because of the location of the Camp and the heightened security situation.

|                       | <i>Variance</i> |        |
|-----------------------|-----------------|--------|
| <b>National staff</b> | (\$296.4)       | (7.6)% |

• **Management: reduced input same output**

41. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the application of a lower salary step level (GS-5/10) in the computation of national staff salary costs, compared with the salary step level (GS-5/11) applied in the approved budget for the 2016/17 period. The reduced requirements were offset in part by increased requirements owing to the application of a vacancy factor of 2.5 per cent in the budget for 2017/18, compared with 5.0 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2016/17 period.

|                                     | <i>Variance</i> |       |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| <b>General temporary assistance</b> | \$311.9         | 17.9% |

• **Management: increased input increased output**

42. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to the proposed establishment of two temporary positions in the Security Section, one at the P-3 level and another at the Field Service level, as described in paragraph 26 above.

|                        | <i>Variance</i> |       |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| <b>Official travel</b> | \$126.3         | 20.1% |

• **Management: increased input increased output**

43. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to the planned increase in the number of trips between the Alpha and Bravo sides, in connection with the return of the Force to Camp Faouar.

|                                      | <i>Variance</i> |        |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| <b>Facilities and infrastructure</b> | \$5 884.8       | 100.6% |

• **Management: increased input increased output**

44. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to: (a) the acquisition of safety and security equipment, such as additional firefighting, security and surveillance equipment, in connection with the return of the Force to Camp Faouar

and the increased presence of the Force on the Bravo side; (b) alteration and renovation services to enable the renovation of buildings in Camp Faouar and positions 71 and 72 and the related acquisition of engineering supplies and water treatment systems; and (c) the planned increase in consumption of fuel for generators to 1,558,700 litres for the 2017/18 period, compared with 392,194 litres as approved in the budget for the 2016/17 period.

|                              | <i>Variance</i> |       |
|------------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| <b>Ground transportation</b> | \$430.6         | 25.0% |

• **Management: increased input increased output**

45. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to: (a) the increase in the planned consumption of fuel of 1,197,300 litres, compared with 389,189 litres included in the approved budget for the 2016/17 period, given the increase in the planned number of convoys and traffic within the area of operations, in connection with the return of the Force to Camp Faouar; and (b) the need for replacement of one refrigerated truck, which will be deployed to the Bravo side.

|                       | <i>Variance</i> |       |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------|
| <b>Communications</b> | \$319.4         | 43.6% |

• **Management: increased input same output**

46. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to the acquisition of communications equipment and supplies, such as network service equipment, call management systems and power supplies, resulting from the need to provide communications capabilities in connection with the return of the Force to Camp Faouar.

|                               | <i>Variance</i> |        |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| <b>Information technology</b> | \$746.3         | 116.2% |

• **Management: increased input same output**

47. The increased requirements are attributable to the return of the Force to Camp Faouar and the resulting need for the acquisition of information technology equipment, such as fixed network equipment (microwave links and towers) and the acquisition of software licences for enterprise applications and software for the operation and processing of high-resolution imagery satellite data, in order to ensure the information technology capabilities of the Force.

|                                               | <i>Variance</i> |       |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| <b>Other supplies, services and equipment</b> | \$613.0         | 54.3% |

• **Management: increased input same output**

48. The increased requirements are attributable to the return of the Force to Camp Faouar and the resulting additional requirements relating to freight costs for safety and security, alteration and renovation, communications and information technology equipment and supplies.

#### **IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly**

49. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of the Force are:

(a) Appropriation of the amount of \$62,276,000 for the maintenance of the Force for the 12-month period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018;

(b) Assessment of the amount in paragraph (a) above at a monthly rate of \$5,189,666 should the Security Council decide to continue the mandate of the Force.

**V. Summary of follow-up action taken to implement the decisions and requests made by the General Assembly in its resolutions 70/286 and 70/742, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the General Assembly**

**A. General Assembly**

(Resolution 70/286)

*Decision/request*

*Action taken to implement decision/request*

*Requests* the Secretary-General to improve the ratio of substantive to support staff, with particular attention to the feasibility of nationalizing functions, especially Field Service level functions, to ensure that the civilian staffing structure is appropriate for the effective implementation of the current mission mandate and that it reflects staffing best practices across other missions (para. 20).

*Urges* the Secretary-General to make every effort to reduce the recruitment lead time for staff in field missions, taking into account the relevant provisions governing recruitment of United Nations staff, to enhance the transparency of the staffing process at all stages and to report on the steps taken and results achieved in the context of the next overview report (para. 22).

*Welcomes* the continued efforts of the Secretary-General to mainstream gender perspectives in United Nations peacekeeping, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that senior gender advisers in all United Nations peacekeeping operations report directly to mission leadership (para. 24).

*Recognizes* the role of women in all aspects of peace and security issues, expresses concern about the gender imbalance in the staffing of peacekeeping operations, particularly at senior levels, requests the Secretary-General to intensify efforts to recruit and retain women in peacekeeping operations, in particular to appoint women to senior United Nations leadership positions, with full respect for the principle of equitable geographical distribution, in conformity with Article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations, considering, in particular, women from troop- and police-

UNDOF has reduced its civilian staffing complement by 30 posts/positions over the past two budget cycles, in line with the reduction of military personnel. The proposed civilian staffing requirements of the Force for the 2017/18 period include the establishment of two posts in the Security Section to ensure the safety and security of all UNDOF personnel as a result of the return of the Force to Camp Faouar.

UNDOF has made efforts to reduce the recruitment lead time and to ensure timely filling of vacancies. In order to reduce the recruitment lead time, the Force has relied upon the roster system to fill vacancies.

UNDOF continues to maintain its network of gender focal points for the purpose of gender mainstreaming and the incorporation of gender perspectives into all mission activities. The Gender Adviser continues to report to the senior leadership of the Force.

UNDOF supports this initiative and regularly engages with counterparts in the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field Support to increase the number of female candidates to fill senior positions. UNDOF continues to make efforts to recruit and retain women and to appoint women to senior positions, taking into consideration the principle of equitable geographical distribution. For example, the Force now has a female Deputy Chief of Mission Support.

contributing countries, and strongly encourages Member States, where applicable, to identify and regularly submit more women candidates for appointment to positions in the United Nations system (para. 25).

*Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to reduce the overall environmental footprint of each peacekeeping mission, including by implementing environmentally friendly waste management and power generation systems, in full compliance with the relevant rules and regulations, including, but not limited to, the United Nations environmental and waste management policy and procedures (para. 31).

*Recognizes* the increasing demands and challenges of the volatile work environment faced in peacekeeping operations, and requests the Secretary-General to strengthen capacity and standards with regard to the 10-1-2 casualty response, including capacity-building, training and education, and to continue to develop innovative solutions in this regard (para. 32).

*Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the security of information and communications in missions, including those gathered from the use of unmanned aerial systems, as a matter of priority (para. 35).

*Further requests* the Secretary-General to present in individual mission budget proposals a clear vision of the annual construction requirements by ensuring, as appropriate, multi-year plans and to continue his efforts to enhance the accuracy of budgeting, by improving aspects of project planning, management and oversight, with due consideration of operational circumstances on the ground, and to closely monitor the execution of works to ensure their timely completion (para. 42).

*Requests* the Secretary-General to strengthen oversight and internal controls in the areas of procurement and asset management across peacekeeping missions, including by holding a named official in mission management accountable for checking stock levels before undertaking any acquisition activity in order to ensure compliance with established asset management policies, taking into account the current and future needs of the mission and the importance of the full implementation of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (para. 43).

UNDOF supports this initiative and has been taking action to reduce the Force's environmental footprint through the implementation of environmentally friendly practices in solar energy, waste management, energy preservation and sewage and wastewater treatment systems.

UNDOF has agreements with international and local medical facilities to fulfil the 10-1-2 casualty response and ensure that all personnel receive adequate medical care when required. In addition, the Force ensures capacity-building, training and education opportunities as required.

UNDOF does not have unmanned aerial systems. The Force implements the standard information, communications and technology security policies.

UNDOF does not have any multi-year projects for the 2017/18 period. The construction activity in relation to the return of the Force to Camp Faouar consists of alteration and renovation work that will be completed within the 2017/18 period.

UNDOF has a dedicated asset management team. One of its core functions is to verify existing inventory levels prior to undertaking any procurement activity and to take into account the operational climate of the Force, which does not allow for year-round access to some positions, in order to ensure optimal supply and compliance with requisite policies.

*Decision/request**Action taken to implement decision/request*

*Encourages* the Secretary-General to utilize local materials, capacity and knowledge in the implementation of construction projects for peacekeeping operations, in compliance with the United Nations Procurement Manual (para. 45).

The Force makes all efforts to utilize local resources whenever possible.

*Recalls* the collective and unanimous position that one substantiated case of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse is one case too many, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that all peacekeeping operations implement fully the United Nations policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations with regard to all civilian, military and police personnel (para. 70).

The response for all peacekeeping missions, including UNDOF, with respect to issues raised in paragraphs 70, 71, 76 and 79-82 of the resolution will be included in the report of the Secretary-General on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.

*Welcomes* the determination of the Secretary-General to fully implement the United Nations policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse, and requests the Secretary-General to report on the results achieved and challenges encountered in the next report (para. 71).

*Calls upon* the Secretary-General to ensure coordination across United Nations entities at the country level in order for victims to receive immediate basic assistance and support in accordance with their individual needs arising from alleged sexual exploitation and abuse (para. 76).

*Requests* the Secretary-General to immediately inform the Member States concerned about allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, of which United Nations entities may become aware, in missions operating under a Security Council mandate, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Member States concerned receive all available information to allow for appropriate follow up by their national authorities (para. 79).

*Recognizes* the risk factors linked to recent allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, as identified by the Secretary-General in paragraph 25 of his latest report, including the rehatting of troops, the absence of predeployment training on standards of conduct, the excessive length of deployment for certain contingents, the living conditions of contingents, including lack of welfare and communication facilities to stay in contact with home, camps being situated in proximity to and not properly separated from the local population, and lack of discipline among some contingents, and in this regard requests the Secretary-General to further analyse

*Decision/request**Action taken to implement decision/request*

all risk factors, including those listed above, in his next report and to provide recommendations to mitigate those risks, taking into account the respective responsibilities of missions, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries (para. 80).

*Stresses* the importance of training all personnel for the prevention of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, as part of the predeployment training, as well as in mission training and awareness-raising programmes, and requests the Secretary-General to expedite the deployment of the e-learning programme (para. 81).

*Recalls* paragraph 175 of the report of the Advisory Committee, and requests the Secretary-General to include in future reports information on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by non-United Nations forces operating under a Security Council mandate (para. 82).

## **B. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions**

(A/70/742)

*Request/recommendation**Action taken to implement request/recommendation*

The Advisory Committee shares the concern of the Board of Auditors over the continuing level and frequency of redeployments among and between expenditure groups and classes across peacekeeping operations (para. 31).

The Committee notes with regret that mission budget proposals for 2016/17 do not always comply with the requirement for all posts that have been vacant for two years or longer to be reviewed and the posts proposed for retention or abolishment (para. 46).

The Committee stresses the need for realistic planning and budgeting and enhanced project monitoring and oversight, including by the appropriate offices within the Department of Field Support at Headquarters and the United Nations Logistics Base, particularly for those projects spanning more than one budgetary cycle. Details of multi-year projects should be included in

The Force continues to closely monitor the level and frequency of redeployments among and between expenditure groups and classes. Redeployments must be approved by the Chief of Mission Support and are only executed after careful consideration and in the case of justifiable operational requirements, owing mainly to events that the Force was not able to foresee at the time of budget formulation.

The Force complies with the requirement to review and propose for retention or abolishment posts that may become vacant for two years or longer.

The Force does not have any multi-year construction projects for the 2017/18 period. The construction activity relating to the return of the Force to Camp Faouar consists of alteration and renovation work that will be completed within the 2017/18 period.

*Request/recommendation**Action taken to implement request/recommendation*

specific budget proposals, including the overall status of implementation at the time of the respective budget request, and those projects valued at \$1 million or more should be clearly identifiable within the budget request (para. 157).

The Committee looks forward to reviewing the results of the analysis currently under way of the possibility of replacing part of the light passenger vehicle fleet with sedan-type, multipurpose and alternative-type vehicles. The Committee trusts that the mission vehicle acquisition plans for the 2017/18 financial period will reflect the outcome of this review (para. 160).

The Force does not have any light passenger vehicle acquisitions planned for the 2017/18 period.

### **Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**

(A/70/742/Add.1)

*Request/recommendation**Action taken to implement the request/recommendation*

With respect to specialized driver training, the Advisory Committee is of the view that it may be more economical for one training specialist to travel to UNDOF to conduct this training in the UNDOF area of operations, under local conditions, if possible, rather than for eight UNDOF staff members to travel outside of the mission area for this purpose. The Advisory Committee, therefore, expects that the Secretary-General will explore this possibility accordingly and, wherever feasible and subject to conditions on the ground, apply this approach in the case of future training requirements (para. 33).

UNDOF has requested personnel who received specialized training to extend their stay to build in-house capacity training aimed at reducing out-of-mission training requirements.

## Annex I

### Definitions

#### A. Terminology relating to proposed changes in human resources

The following terms have been applied with respect to proposed changes in human resources (see sect. I of the present report):


- **Post establishment:** a new post is proposed to be established when additional resources are necessary and when it is not possible to redeploy resources from other offices or otherwise accommodate specific activities from within existing resources.
- **Post reassignment:** an approved post that was intended to cover a certain function is proposed to implement other priority mandated activities unrelated to the original function. While a post reassignment may involve a change of location or office, it does not change the category or level of the post.
- **Post redeployment:** an approved post is proposed to be redeployed to cover comparable or related functions in another office.
- **Post reclassification:** an approved post is proposed to be reclassified (upgraded or downgraded) when the duties and responsibilities of the post have changed substantially.
- **Post abolishment:** an approved post is proposed to be abolished if it is no longer needed to implement the activities for which it was approved or to implement other priority mandated activities within the mission.
- **Post conversion:** three possible options for post conversion are as follows:
  - Conversion of general temporary assistance positions to posts: approved positions financed under general temporary assistance are proposed for conversion to posts if the functions being performed are of a continuing nature.
  - Conversion of individual contractors or individuals on procurement contracts to national staff posts: taking into account the continuing nature of certain functions, in line with section VIII, paragraph 11, of General Assembly resolution 59/296, individual contractors or individuals on procurement contracts are proposed for conversion to national staff posts.
  - Conversion of international staff posts to national staff posts: approved international staff posts are proposed for conversion to national staff posts.

## B. Terminology relating to variance analysis

Section III of the present report indicates the single largest contributing factor of each resource variance according to specific standard options encompassed in the four standard categories listed below:

- **Mandate:** variances caused by changes in the scale or scope of the mandate, or changes in the expected accomplishments as driven by the mandate
- **External:** variances caused by parties or situations external to the United Nations
- **Cost parameters:** variances caused by United Nations regulations, rules and policies
- **Management:** variances caused by management actions to achieve planned results more effectively (e.g., by reprioritizing or adding certain outputs) or efficiently (e.g., by taking measures to reduce personnel or operational inputs while maintaining the same level of outputs) and/or from performance-related issues (e.g., by having underestimated the costs or quantities of inputs required to produce a certain level of outputs, or by delayed recruitment)

# Organization chart




Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; FS (PL), Field Service (Principal level); ICT, Information and Communications Technology;

NGS, national General Service.

\* To be funded under general temporary assistance

## Map



**General Assembly  
Security Council**Distr.: General  
7 February 2017

Original: English

**General Assembly  
Seventy-first session**  
Agenda items 32 and 37**Security Council  
Seventy-second year****Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their  
implications for international peace, security  
and development****The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan****Letter dated 6 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative  
of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General**

The continuing aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan has led to the temporary occupation of a significant part of Azerbaijan's territory, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the seven adjacent districts and some exclaves. The war has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, ruined cities and livelihoods in my country and resulted in the forcible expulsion of more than 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and properties.

Serious violations of international humanitarian law amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide were committed by the Armenian side in the course of the aggression. Such violations include, inter alia, indiscriminate attacks, the killing of civilians, the taking and holding of hostages, the mistreatment and summary execution of prisoners of war and hostages, sexual violence, the extensive destruction of inhabited areas and public and private property, pillaging and forced displacement.

This month marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the atrocious crime committed against the civilians and defenders of the town of Khojaly, in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. What happened in Khojaly in February 1992 was the largest massacre in the conflict.

Before the war, 7,000 people lived in that town. From October 1991, the town was entirely surrounded by the Armenian forces and their affiliates. In the night of 25 to 26 February 1992, following massive artillery bombardments, the assault on the town began from various directions. As a result of the attack and capture of the town, hundreds of Azerbaijanis, including women, children and the elderly, were killed, wounded or taken hostage, while the town was razed to the ground.



The following year, the Security Council adopted four resolutions on the conflict<sup>1</sup> condemning the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and reaffirming respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory. In response to Armenia's territorial claims and actions, the Council reconfirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an integral part of Azerbaijan and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all the occupied territories. A series of Security Council presidential statements adopted between 1992 and 1995 and documents of other international organizations are couched in the same terms.

In its resolutions and presidential statements, the Security Council further expressed grave concern about "the displacement of a large number of civilians in Azerbaijan and the serious humanitarian emergency in the region", condemned the "attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic" and reaffirmed that the parties "are bound to comply with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law".

Other international organizations also strongly deplored the Armenian side for the use of military force and affirmed its direct responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the course of the war.

Thus, having considered the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in the area of combat operation, particularly the massacre in the town of Khojaly in February 1992, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in a declaration of 11 March 1992 expressed deep concern "about recent reports of indiscriminate killings and outrages", firmly condemned "the violence and attacks directed against the civilian populations in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of the Azerbaijan Republic" and underlined that "no solution imposed by force can be accepted by the international community".<sup>2</sup>

In 1993, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margaretha af Ugglas, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Council of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), underlined that acquisition of territory by force can never be condoned or accepted as a basis for territorial claims<sup>3</sup> and expressed grave concern at the unacceptable scorched-earth policy practiced by the Armenian armed forces.<sup>4</sup>

In its resolution 1416 (2005) of 25 January 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted particularly that "considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces" and that "the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing".

<sup>1</sup> Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993).

<sup>2</sup> Declaration adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 March 1992 at the 471bis meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.

<sup>3</sup> Council of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Communication No. 284, Prague, 26 October 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Council of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Communication No. 301, Prague, 19 November 1993.

Referring to the reports of independent sources, the European Court of Human Rights pointed out that "at the time of the capture of Khojaly on the night of 25 to 26 February 1992 hundreds of civilians of Azerbaijani ethnic origin were reportedly killed, wounded or taken hostage, during their attempt to flee the captured town, by Armenian fighters attacking the town". The Court qualified atrocities committed in Khojaly as "acts of particular gravity which may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity".<sup>5</sup>

There are abundant sources, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses to the tragedy, statements by authoritative international institutions and the findings of independent investigations by foreign journalists, human rights activists and authoritative international non-governmental organizations, which also contribute to corroborating the facts on the ground.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, based on the results of their inquiries, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki and the Memorial Human Rights Centre placed direct responsibility for the civilian deaths with the Armenian forces. In her letter dated 24 March 1997 addressed to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki responded as follows to attempts by the Armenian propaganda to obfuscate this human rights organization with fabrications:

Our research and that of the Memorial Human Rights Centre found that the retreating militia fled Khojaly along with some of the large groups of fleeing civilians. Our report noted that by remaining armed and in uniform, the Azerbaijani militia may be considered as combatants and thus endangered fleeing civilians, even if their intent had been to protect them. *Yet we place direct responsibility for the civilian deaths with Karabakh Armenian forces. Indeed, neither our report nor that of [the Centre] includes any evidence to support the argument that Azerbaijani forces obstructed the flight of, or fired on Azeri civilians.*<sup>7</sup>

Referring to a report by a Reuters correspondent in Aghdam, Azerbaijan, *The Independent* reported that "after a massacre, Azeris were burying scores of people who died when Armenians overran the town of Khojaly, the second-biggest Azeri settlement in the area. 'The world is turning its back on what's happening here. We are dying and you are just watching', one mourner shouted at a group of journalists".<sup>8</sup>

The Australian newspaper, *The Age*, reported that "the exact number of victims is still unclear, but there can be little doubt that Azeri civilians were massacred by the Armenian Army in the snowy mountains of Nagorno-Karabakh last week".<sup>9</sup>

Pascal Privat and Steve Le Vine of *Newsweek*, in their article entitled "The face of a massacre" reported as follows:

<sup>5</sup> Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 22 April 2010, para. 87.

<sup>6</sup> For more information, see <http://www.justiceforkhojaly.org/>.

<sup>7</sup> Emphasis added. The full text of the letter is available from <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/1997/03/24/azerba16933.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> *The Independent*, 29 February 1992.

<sup>9</sup> *The Age*, 6 March 1992.

Azerbaijan was a charnel house again last week: a place of mourning refugees and dozens of mangled corpses dragged to a makeshift morgue behind the mosque. They were ordinary Azerbaijani men, women and children of Khojaly, a small village in war-torn Nagorno-Karabakh overrun by Armenian forces on 25-26 February. Many were killed at close range while trying to flee; some had their faces mutilated, others were scalped.<sup>10</sup>

Jill Smolowe of *Time* magazine in her article "Massacre in Khojaly" reported as follows:

While the details are argued, this much is plain: something grim and unconscionable happened in the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly two weeks ago. So far, some 200 dead Azerbaijanis, many of them mutilated, have been transported out of the town tucked inside the Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh for burial in neighbouring Azerbaijan. The total number of deaths — the Azerbaijanis claim 1,324 civilians have been slaughtered, most of them women and children — is unknown.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, public statements by Armenian officials and the leaders of the subordinate separatist regime, as well as by other witnesses, are undoubtedly regarded as admission of liability. As the International Court of Justice made it clear, "statements of this kind, emanating from high-ranking official political figures, sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of particular probative value when they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavorable to the State represented by the person who made them. They may then be construed as a form of admission".<sup>12</sup>

It should be particularly noted that Khojaly was seized when the incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan of the Republic of Armenia served as head of the separatist regime's "self-defence forces committee" and, accordingly, his recollections constitute one of the most important sources of evidence. The following words by Mr. Sargsyan, at an interview when he was Armenia's Minister of Defense, leave no doubts as to the question of the perpetrator of the crime in Khojaly:

Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that's what happened. And we should also take into account that amongst those boys were people who had fled from Baku and Sumgayit.<sup>13</sup>

Further, Mr. Sargsyan debunked the myth about the corridor allegedly left open by the assailants for the civilian population of Khojaly. Thus, answering the question on this issue, he readily concedes that "generally speaking, this was after Khojaly", since at the time "there was a certain amount of ethnic cleansing", as "it's impossible to do this any other way".

<sup>10</sup> *Newsweek*, 16 March 1992.

<sup>11</sup> *Time*, 16 March 1992.

<sup>12</sup> See *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986.

<sup>13</sup> See Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York and London, 2004).

Finally, in answer to the question as to whether he had any regrets about the deaths of thousands of people, Mr. Sargsyan said: "I have absolutely no regrets", since "such upheavals are necessary, even if thousands have to die".

These words from a person holding the highest political and military post in Armenia speak for themselves and disprove any denial of responsibility for the crimes committed in Khojaly and elsewhere in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

In his article, Jirair Libaridian, who was chief advisor to the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, at the time of the Khojaly massacre, admitted that "it is very difficult for an Armenian to write about Khojali" because "something unacceptable did happen, something that involved killings and mutilation of Azeri civilians by Armenian forces in Karabakh".<sup>14</sup>

According to another Armenian author, Markar Melkonian, in his book dedicated to his brother, Monte Melkonian, who personally took part in the assault on Khojaly, the town "had been a strategic goal, but it had also been an act of revenge".<sup>15</sup> Melkonian particularly mentions the role of the fighters of the two Armenian military detachments "Arabo" and "Aramo" and describes in detail how they butchered the peaceful inhabitants of Khojaly. Thus, as he puts it, some inhabitants of the town had almost made it to safety, after fleeing for nearly six miles, when "[Armenian] soldiers had chased them down". The soldiers, in his words, "unsheathed the knives they had carried on their hips for so long, and began stabbing".<sup>15</sup>

The overall assessment of the causes and consequences of the war and all existing facts of mass killings in Khojaly make it absolutely clear that the crimes committed in that town were not an isolated or sporadic act, but part of Armenia's widespread and systematic policy and practice of carrying out atrocities.

The official investigation conducted in Azerbaijan found that the specific elements of the crime of genocide, as defined under international law, were present with regard to the attacks on civilians in Khojaly and that the necessary requirements had been met for the purpose of sustaining the genocide charges to that end.

The impunity still enjoyed by the perpetrators of the crimes committed in the course of the aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan not only impedes progress in achieving the long-awaited peace and reconciliation between the two countries, but also aggravates the already difficult situation in the peace process and contributes to Armenia's growing sense of permissiveness. The examples below are illustrative in that regard.

First, in total disregard of the demands of the Security Council and in flagrant violation of international law, Armenia makes purposeful efforts towards consolidating the current status quo of the occupation, strengthening its military build-up in the seized territories, changing their demographic, cultural and physical

<sup>14</sup> Jirair Libaridian, "An Armenian Perspective on Khojali", 19 February 2014.

<sup>15</sup> See Markar Malkonian, *My Brother's Road: An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia* (London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 2005).

character and preventing the hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced Azerbaijanis from returning to their homes and properties in those areas.<sup>16</sup>

Second, regular ceasefire violations and attacks on the towns and villages in Azerbaijan situated along the line of contact of the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the border between the two States, have become more frequent and violent in recent times, resulting in the killing and injuring of Azerbaijani civilians residing near those areas.

Thus, starting in the early morning of 2 April 2016, the armed forces of Armenia increased fighting from their positions in the occupied territories, subjecting the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the line of contact and the adjacent densely populated areas under the control of Azerbaijan to intensive fire with heavy artillery and large-calibre weapons. As a result of Armenia's attacks and subsequent hostilities, 34 towns and villages in Azerbaijan were shelled, causing casualties among civilians and the servicemen of the armed forces of Azerbaijan as well as destroying or substantially damaging private and public property, including residences, schools and kindergartens.

On 10 April 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) facilitated the handover, by both sides, of the bodies of those killed in action following the recent escalation.<sup>17</sup> The forensic medical examinations performed subsequently registered numerous signs of post-mortem mutilation of the bodies of Azerbaijani servicemen.<sup>18</sup>

In May 2016, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees conducted a mission to the affected areas in Azerbaijan. In its assessment report,<sup>19</sup> the Mission pointed out the following:

Azerbaijani villages living along the [line of contact] have been coping with the regular violations of the ceasefire for the last 20 years. *Since the beginning of April 2016, however, the situation on the [line of contact] has changed fundamentally* due to the use of new and heavier types of military hardware inflicting worse damage and reaching further behind the frontlines.

The Mission also found that the intense fighting that flared up again on 27 to 28 April had had an even worse impact on settlements, particularly for the civilians living in the Goranboy, Tartar, Aghdam and Aghjebedi districts of Azerbaijan. The Mission further noted that "many of the civilians on [the line of contact] lost their livestock to the bombardments and their fields are now contaminated with [unexploded ordnance]" and that "many schools are damaged and closed in the area near the frontline in Goranboy, Tartar, Aghdam and Aghjebedi".

<sup>16</sup> For more information, see A/70/1016-S/2016/711.

<sup>17</sup> See <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nagorno-karabakh-icrc-facilitates-retrieval-and-transfer-those-killed-action>.

<sup>18</sup> For more information, see A/70/838-S/2016/363 and A/70/842-S/2016/370.

<sup>19</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Azerbaijan, assessment mission report entitled "Populations affected by the violence on the line of contact in April 2016", 15 May 2016.

Third, since the beginning of the conflict, Armenia has extensively practiced the taking and holding of hostages and mistreatment and summary execution of prisoners of war and other captives.

Thus, at the beginning of January 2017, 3,867 citizens of Azerbaijan were registered as missing as a result of the conflict, including 3,123 servicemen and 744 civilians. Among the civilians, 62 are children (20 girls and 42 boys), 261 are women and 301 are elderly persons (including 152 women). It has been established that 873 of the 3,867 missing persons were either taken as prisoners of war or hostages, including 591 servicemen and 282 civilians, of whom 29 are children (7 girls and 22 boys), 99 are women and 112 are elderly persons (including 63 women).<sup>20</sup>

A clear list of the missing citizens of Azerbaijan has been submitted to Armenia through ICRC and is being regularly updated. However, Armenia has failed to account either properly or at all for the missing persons within its control and to conduct a prompt and effective investigation into the arguable claims that such persons have been taken into its custody and have not been seen since.

On 11 July 2014, the Armenian armed forces killed an Azerbaijani civilian, Hassan Hassanov, and captured two others, Dilgam Askarov and Shahbaz Guliyev, who were attempting to visit the graves of their relatives in the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan. The Armenian side not only did not release these civilians, but also fabricated charges against them and unlawfully sentenced Mr. Askarov to life imprisonment and Mr. Guliyev to 22 years in jail, while the body of Mr. Hassanov was returned to Azerbaijan, with the facilitation of ICRC, after almost three months, on 2 October 2014.<sup>21</sup>

That was not the only instance of the Armenian side delaying the return of human remains and even trying to speculate and blackmail on such a sensitive issue. On 29 December 2016, Chingiz Gurbanov, a servicemen of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, was killed in the fighting to halt an attempted incursion by an Armenian subversive group on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Immediately after the incident, ICRC offered its services, in its role as neutral intermediary, to facilitate the transfer of the soldier's body. Despite that and the insistent appeals of the international community, including the specific emphasis in their respective statements on the humanitarian nature of the issue,<sup>22</sup> the body was returned from Armenia to Azerbaijan only on the fortieth day, on 5 February 2017.

In conclusion, it is essential to state once again that the unlawful presence of the armed forces of Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is the main cause of tensions and incidents that lead to human losses and sufferings in the conflict zone and the major impediment to the political settlement of the conflict.

<sup>20</sup> See the website of the State Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons, (<http://www.human.gov.az/en/view-page/27/%C6%8FS%C4%B0R,%20G%C4%B0ROV%20V%C6%8F%20%C4%B0TK%C4%B0N%20D%C3%9C%C5%9EM%C3%9C%C5%9EL%C6%8FR#WJSZ01UrKUK>).

<sup>21</sup> See the statement by Azerbaijan at the 7374th meeting of the Security Council, on 30 January 2015 (S/PV.7374).

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, the statements by the Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group of 9 January 2017 and by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of 11 January 2017.

The only way to achieve a durable and lasting solution is to ensure the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and from other occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

At the same time, the establishment of truth with respect to gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed during the conflict, the provision of adequate and effective reparations to victims and the need for institutional actions to prevent the repetition of such violations are among the necessary prerequisites for sustainable peace and long-term stability. It is therefore important that peace efforts, including those being undertaken towards the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, never encourage, accept or tolerate the situations achieved by the unlawful use of force and other egregious violations of international law, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing. The Republic of Azerbaijan will spare no effort towards achieving the political settlement of the conflict and ensuring peace and justice in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 32 and 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar Aliyev  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



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**Letter dated 3 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of  
Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting for your attention the press release of the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, dated 1 February 2017, on the subversive infiltration attempt by the armed forces of Azerbaijan in the northern direction (Talish) of the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan (see annex).

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Zohrab Mnatsakanyan**  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



**Annex to the letter dated 3 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

[1 February 2017]

On 1 February, at about 3 p.m., the Azerbaijani armed forces, taking advantage of the foggy weather conditions, made a subversive reconnaissance infiltration attempt in the northern direction (Talış) of the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan. The Defence Army of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic vanguard units, promptly revealing the advance of the Azerbaijani special forces, took preventive action and threw them back, causing casualties. As a result of the organized counter-subversive operation, the NKR Defence Army vanguard units took captive a soldier of the Azerbaijani Army, Elnur Husseynzade, born in 1995 in Barda town. According to reliable data, at least one serviceman from the Azerbaijani side was wounded, a fact that was also affirmed by the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry's press release today.

The NKR Defence Army vanguard units continue to confidently carry out their military duties along the entire line of contact and are ready to neutralize any attack.

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